HomeMy WebLinkAboutItem B 4 L
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January 10, 2000
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STAFF REPORT
TO: Chairman & Members of the Redevelopment Agency
FROM: Keith R. Till, Executive Director
SUBJECT: Trailer Park Rent Review
SUMMARY OF REQUEST:
Redevelopment Agency to formally dispute the rent increase proposed by the Seal Beach Trailer
Park owner. Agency to find no dispute over alternative rent increase of approximately 7.8%,
effective November 16, 1999.
BACKGROUND:
Under the covenant governing the Seal Beach Trailer Park, the trailer park's new owner is
entitled to a rent increase. However, the largest component of the request ("loan payment") is
apparently based upon the financing used by the new owner to purchase the park. Agency
Counsel has consistently provided the opinion that any additional costs incurred by the owner
due to new financing or refinancing cannot be passed through to the tenants. The park owner
disputes this interpretation and has submitted a proposal to raise rent by more than 36%.
At issue, in part, is whether the owner is entitled to raise rent to recoup increased debt service
costs. This issue was previously raised in 1989, when the prior owner (Mr. Dawson) requested an
increase based upon increased debt service costs associated with refinancing. Tom Parrington,
Special Counsel to the Agency at that time, interpreted the Covenant as allowing a rate increase
based upon specified costs, including the costs associated with the original loan used to purchase
the land at the time the park was relocated. However, it was Mr. Parrington's opinion that rent
increases could not be based upon refinancing. In reliance on that opinion, the Agency disputed
the portion of the request based upon the increased costs associated with refinancing. Mr.
Dawson accepted the Agency's position and never contested the Agency's action. Upon review
of the Covenant and the manner in which it has been interpreted in the past, Agency Counsel
concurs with Mr. Parrington's opinion.
The so-called "loan payment" has always been the largest component of the rent formula, but it
has always been based upon the original financing. The new owner's loan payment is about
$7,000 a month higher that the previous owner's, because the amount of debt has increased (part
of the increase in the amount of debt is the cost of buying out the ground lease; although the
additional debt service is not allowed as an expense for rent increase purposes, the "ground rent"
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Item B
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Trailer Park Rent Review
January 10, 2000 - Page 2
that would have been payable under the ground lease is still being treated as an expense even
though the owner no longer pays any ground rent. Without the ability to charge the additional
$7,000 per month, the owner can only justify more modest rent increases based on operating
expense adjustments (including an increase in the "ground rent"), which are generally aligned
with the CPI.
In summary, it would be our recommendation that the Redevelopment Agency approve a rent
increase of$2,623 per month, or 7.8%. This compares to the requested increase of$12,709, or
37.63%, which was submitted by Bill Talley on September 22. Of the $9,486 in dispute, $6,340
is attributable to the difference between the original loan payment and the new "loan payment."
While several other line items — such as legal expenses and repairs and maintenance— are also in
dispute, they are minor in comparison and, in staff's opinion, there is insufficient basis for
granting increases for these until perhaps next year, when actual documentation of a full-year's
expenses can be provided.
Since there has been no rent increase at the trailer park since 1993, the increase before the
Agency tonight would average out to 1.59% per year, with no compounding.
ALTERNATIVES:
During the months of rent review discussions, a number of potentially viable compromise
measures have been raised. Among the more promising was a plan to keep intact the more
restrictive rent control formula for all existing residents under the trailer park covenant, for as
long as they remain residents of the park, but to allow the standard county rent control rate to
apply to any new tenants. New trailers would be allowed in under this plan.
Informal discussions with tenant's representatives indicate they might consider this alternative,
but no formal response has been provided. It would not, in our opinion, be appropriate for the
Agency to intervene on this kind of issue without the tenants requesting it.
SUMMARY:
As a matter of practicality, the Agency must address the rent increase proposal first, then look to
the question of whether the tenants can purchase the park, which is an interest they have
expressed. If the purchase proves infeasible, the Agency can revisit the compromise alternatives,
should the tenants so desire.
RECOMMENDATION: Redevelopment Agency to approve a motion approving
implementation of the attached rent schedule effective November 16, 1999.
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Seal Beach Trailer Park
Rental Adjustment
Current Proposed SB RDA
Rents Rent Inc. Proposed
By Hall & Assoc Rents
Ground Rent $3,666.67 $4,051.28 $4,051.28
Loan Payment 11,060.48 18,000.00 11,060.48
Auto 18.83 0.00 0.00
Dues/Subscriptions 0.00 0.00 0.00
Insurance 1,209.75 518.50 518.50
Legal/Acct. 285.25 3,539.60 783.00
Operating Supplies 651.92 119.09 119.09
Taxes& Licenses 1,691.42 3,000.00 3,000.00
Repairs & Mtn. 900.42 1,266.83 877.00
Salaries/Wages 3,757.30 4,092.82 4,092.82
Taxes-Payroll 494.73 538.92 538.92
Telephone 0.00 152.87 152.87
Overhead & Mgmt. 4,606.41 5,115.81 5,115.81
Investment Retuurn 2,354.00 2,354.00 2,354.00
Utilities 2,478.75 3,735.34 3,735.34
$33,175.93 $46,485.06 $36,399.11
SEAL BEACH TRAILER PARK
Resident Owners' Association
.f>
1198 PCH D-242
Seal Beach, CA 90740
Keith Till
City Manager
Quinn Barrow
City Attorney
City of Seal Beach
Dear Mr. Till:
The Seal Beach Trailer Park Resident Owners' Association requests the entire document package
pertaining to the request for a rent increase dated May 24, 1999. The residents of the park will be
affected by any action taken by Richard Hall. We therefore feel it would be of great benefit to be
informed in advance of any potential actions taken by Mr. Hall or his legal representatives.
Sincerely,
s&_ & at' ICI-La-14 Aso
o GGc-tiol�
Seal Beach Resident Owners' Association
1
' AENDA
MEETING WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
CITY OF SEAL BEACH
' AND
MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES
OF
' SEAL BEACH TRAILER PARK
1
JUNE 3, 1999
1
1
1
Presented By:
Terry R. Dowdall, Esq.
' DOWDALL LAW OFFICES, A.P.C.
284 NORTH GLASSELL STREET, FIRST FLOOR
ORANGE, CALIFORNIA 92866-1409
TELEPHONE (714) 532-2222
FACSIMILE (714) 532-3238
1
' CONTENT
INTRODUCTION 1
I. REQUIRING THE REMOVAL OF RECREATIONAL VEHICLES AND
' TRAVEL TRAILERS ON SALE 3
t II. THE COVENANT VIOLATES THE FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING ACT(42
U.S.C.§3600,et seq.)AND SUBJECTS THE CITY TO DAMAGES,INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF, CIVIL PENALTIES,PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND PROSECUTION BY
THE UNITED STATES JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 8
III. FAILURE OF LOCAL ASSUMPTION OF JURISDICTION UNDER THE
MOBILEHOME PARKS ACT AND NEED FOR RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF
JURISDICTION BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT- NON-COMPLIANCE WITH CODE FOR
TWO STORY CABANAS MORE THAN 14 FEET IN HEIGHT - FAILURE TO
' ENFORCE UNOBSTRUCTED ACCESS TO ROADWAY AND RELATED FIRE
HAZARD, FAILURE TO ENFORCE CURRENT REGISTRATION
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE LICENSING OF RECREATIONAL VEHICLES 12
'
IV. FAILURE TO FILE ANNUAL REPORTS WITH CALIFORNIA
COASTAL COMMISSION 18
V. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE 25 OF THE CODE OF
' ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS BY TENANCY COVENANTS REQUIRING
"COMPLIANCE WITH ALL LAWS..." BY ELIMINATION OF NUISANCES,
HEALTH AND SAFETY DANGERS,AND CODE AND REGULATION
VIOLATIONS 18
1
VI. RELIEF FROM THE COVENANT BY THE MERGER OF TITLE OF
' THE GROUND LESSOR AND THE LESSEE 21
VII. FAILURE TO PROVIDE FOR LOW AND MODERATE INCOME
HOUSING BY ALLOWING"SCALPING"OF LOW INCOME TENANCY
RIGHTS(SELLING THE RIGHT OF TENANCY AT FAIR MARKET VALUE);
RELIEF FROM THE COVENANT BY REASON OF CHANGED CONDITIONS;
' 23
VIII. RELIEF FROM THE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY CONFISCATORY
' EFFECTS OF SEVERABLE PARCEL OF LAND USED AS A TRAILER PARK,
AS A SEPARATE"LINE" OR ENTERPRISE OF THE OWNER l
' IX. CLOSURE TO AVOID UNCONSTITUTIONALLY CONFISCATORY
EFFECT OF COVENANT RENDERING THE CURRENT USE OF TRAILER
PARK AS NOT ECONOMICALLY VIABLE 33
X. NOTIFICATION OF RENT INCREASE 41
' CONCLUSION 43
I
IINTRODUCTION
In twenty years of practicing law exclusively in the sub-specialty of mobilehome park
Ilaw, I have never before observed the high degree, indeed the pervasive extent of indifference
and disregard for the requirements of the applicable code in Seal Beach Trailer Park. It would
I appear from cursory review that the requirements of Title 25 of the Code of Administrative
Regulations have in several instances been completely ignored,ostensibly due to the inattention
of the City as enforcement agency charged with enforcement thereof. In other more serious
I
respects, it appears that the City has consciously elected to ignore its statutory duties.
Moreover,the park owner and the public have several statutorily vested rights to enforce
il I code against offending tenants and the conditions of their trailer spaces. Enforcement of such
code is in many instances a vested right of the park owner, such as the right to require the
removal of a recreational vehicle or travel trailer on sale by a then-current tenant, and the right
Iof inspection of a mobilehome (which is required to be allowed to be sold within the park), for
code compliance under Civil Code section 798.73, which includes Title 25 of the California
I Code of Administrative Regulations. These rights and privileges are under further review to
determine the full extent of the park owner's opportunities and duties concerning the trailer
park.
I Analysis has also beenperformed as to the rights of the park owner under the infamous
Y g
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"covenant" last modified in 1981, and the intervening changed conditions which, in my view,
render the covenant unconstitutionally confiscatory in this park owner's case and therefore
unenforceable. Yet, such a claim is overshadowed by the terms of the covenant itself, in light
I of the fact that the lessor, as owner of the fee absolute, is expressly not bound by the covenant.
Under the doctrine of merger and by reason of the express terms of the covenant itself,it is clear
that the acquisition of the fee by the lessee, causing a merger of the lease and fee into a fee
I simple absolute by operation of law and intent of the covenant, pel se, legally dissolves the
covenant as to the current fee owner. The covenant expressly states that the fee owner is not
bound by the covenant. The covenant therefore reinforces the analysis of this legal issue by
Iaddressing the rights of the fee owner expressly.Just why the fee owner was expressly, by the
covenant, not bound or otherwise prevented from effecting a merger, is likely based on the
constitutional implications of what otherwise would have clearly constituted a taking of property
Iin violation of due process of law. Whatever the reason is of no moment, because the plain
language of the covenant is clear and unconditional.
IHowever, as interpreted by the City, even though the park owner holds title to the fee
simple absolute, he remains subject to the same debilitating restrictions from which the fee
I owner was to be expressly free and unfettered. There is simply no authority or support for this
fatuous proposition. It is an inherently wrongful exercise of governmental power.
IWhatever the reasons for not binding the fee owner, they apply with equal force to the
successor-in-interest. The covenant could have easily anticipated the merger doctrine: it is no
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Iarcane, esoteric or convoluted rarity in the law. It did not because the fee owner was deemed
to be free exercise those inalienable rights guaranteed under the constitution,including the right
I of hypothecation to a lessee. Nor is there any covenant restricting the lessee from becoming the
fee owner. It would be frivolous to argue to the contrary. The inescapable conclusion is that a
merger has taken place and this park owner is not bound by the covenant.
IThe violation of the Federal Fair Housing laws bythe effect of the covenant is a glaring
reason for immediate attention to these matters. As demonstrated below,wealth is the critical
Ideterminant for access to this low income housing;wealth is tied to minority and sexual status.
The covenant as it has been enforced, discriminates on at least the grounds of race, national
I origin, color and sex. For example, 1990 census data show that there is not a single black
female head of household with children in the entire city. The investigation of municipal
enforcement of discriminatory terms in housing is conducted by the United States Department
Iof Justice.
Moreover, in the event that the City were not to voluntarily cease and desist from the
Ienforcement of the covenant as would be the proper and required course of action, and further
assuming arguendo, that the courts were insensitive to the views of the park owner, the park
I owner would, based on the absence of economic viability of the continued operation of the
trailer park, be required to consider a closure of the trailer park community. After representing
several park owners who were required to go out of business and close their parks for a variety
I of reasons, but all ultimately economic, the ultimate property rights option, as constitutionally
protected, is to cease doing business. Since "reasonable costs of relocation" limit the cost of a
closure, and indeed while such restrictions pose constitutional issues which have been
Iadjudicated in other jurisdictions overturning burdensome relocation cost requirements, the
park owner may be left with no other option.
IThe closure option became unavoidable as an option which I assisted in implementing
in Treasure Island Mobilehome Park in Laguna Beach, California, amid an initially
I overzealous and unrealistic majoritarian opposition. Of late however, the electorate has now
endorsed a major commercial use by turning away a referendum to kill the plans for the major
destination resort mixed with commercial use and permanent dwellings.The voters recognized,
I among other things, that increased tax revenues are good for the city as a whole. I have no
reason to believe that Seal Beach voters would not also rather find a source of new City revenue
(the trailer tenants pay no tax to the city at all, and many of the units are not registered either)
Iat the expense, if necessary, of a gentrified populous which in no way represents low and
moderate income voters, but rather a privileged few who have made exorbitant profits
monetizing the under market rents by inflating the value of the trailers being sold. One such
Ioffer recently made was for sale of a trailer at $65,000.00! It takes little to see that in reality,
the under market lease is being sold, much like discredited "key money" or entrance fees to
I have access to the trailer park. While income may be a factor, wealth is not. As administered,
the process seemingly perpetuated by the City discriminates against the poor and
underprivileged. This phenomena shows there is no rational basis whatsoever for the covenant.
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' These and many other issues are discussed below. The park owner has authorized me
to present the course of action I have recommended to the City for purposes of maintaining an
I open flow of communications and to discuss options which may be available for the
amelioration of any potential acrimony which may,in my experience,occur when a park owner
seeks to exercise his rights (especially when doing so may be unpopular from a majoritarian
Ipolitical perspective). The park owner desires to pose these issues and seek a response from the
City prior to reaching any decisions respecting the appropriate manner in which to address the
Imany issues I have raised herein.
I thank you in advance for the courtesy of your time in accommodating a meeting with
I me and park owner's management representative, Mr. William Talley to discuss these matters
in greater detail.
I I. REQUIRING THE REMOVAL OF RECREATIONAL
VEHICLES AND TRAVEL TRAILERS ON SALE
IThe park owner is entitled to require a trailer to be removed on sale. The park owner
intends to follow this statutory requirement. The covenant does not speak to any encumbrance
I of the right of the park owner to exercise such rights under the Mobilehome Residency Law,
and therefore no restriction can be found which would affect this right. Exercise of such a right
would also be consistent with the intended use of a trailer park, which is recreational or
Itransient use.
There is no room left to try to define an inherently transient life style as permanent in
Icontravention of State law, the plain meaning of the zoning ordinance itself, and the rights of
the park owner to enjoy the benefits expressly applicable to trailer tenants. Simply put,the City
may not define an apple as an orange (or a recreational vehicle as a mobilehome) because of
Ian unspoken agenda to increase its low income housing base,if that be true bent of the council.
I Trailers are inherently and legally transient in nature. State law defines a recreational
vehicle in Health and Safety Code . Section 18010 as follows:
I Recreational vehicle 'means either the following:
(a)A motorhome, travel trailer, truck camper, or camping trailer, with or without motive power,
designed for human habitation for recreational, emergency, or other occupancy, which meets all of the
I following criteria:
(1) It contains less than 320 square feet of internal living room area, excluding built-in
I equipment, including but not limited, wardrobe, closets, cabinets, kitchen units or fixtures, and
bath or toilet rooms.
(2) It contains 400 square feet or less of gross area measured at maximum horizontal
' projections.
(3) It is built on a single chassis.
(4) It is either self-propelled, truck-mounted, or permanently durable on the highways without
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IARENTCON.SF.ALBCH.00 1.032499 SEAL BEACH TRAILER PARK AGENDA Page 3
' a permit.
(b)A park trailer designed for human habitation for recreational or seasonal use only,
' which meets all of the following criteria:
(1)It contains 400 square feet or less of gross floor area measured at the maximum horizontal
projections. However, it may not exceed 12 feet in width or 40 feet in length in the traveling
mode.
(2) It is built on a single chassis.
(3) It may only be transported upon the public highways with a permit." Health and Safety
' Code Section 18010.
' Civil Code Section 798.3 defines a mobilehome as follows:
(a) 'Mobilehome"is a structure designed for human habitation and for being moved on
a street or highway under permit pursuant to Section 35790 of the Vehicle Code. Mobilehome
' includes a manufactured home, as defined in Section 18007 of the Health and Safety Code, and
a mobilehome, as defined in Section 18008 of the Health and Safety Code, but, except as
provided in subdivision (b), does not include a recreational vehicle, as defined in Section 799.29
of this code and Section 18010 of the Health and Safety Code or a commercial coach as defined
in Section 18001.8 of the Health and Safety Code.
I (b) "Mobilehome,"for purposes of this chapter, other than Section 798.73,
also includes trailers and other recreational vehicles of all types d f ned in Section 18010 of the
Health and Safety Code, other than motor homes, truck campers, and camping trailers, which
' are used for human habitation if the occupancy criteria of either paragraph (1) or(2), as follows,
are met:
' (1) The trailer or other recreational vehicle occupies a mobilehome site in the park, on November
15, 1992, under a rental agreement with a tern of one month or longer, and the trailer or other
recreational vehicle occupied a mobilehome site in the park prior to January 1, 1991.
' (2) The trailer or other recreational vehicle occupies a mobilehome site in the park for nine or
more continuous months commencing on or after November 15, 1992.
"Mobilehome"does not include a trailer or other recreational vehicle located in a recreational
' vehicle park subject to Chapter 2.6 (commencing with Section 799.20), except as otherwise
provided in subdivision (b) of Section 799.45.
Civil Code section 798.73 defines the right of the mobilehome tenant to sell the
mobilehome in place to a new purchaser. The statute expressly excludes this right as to the
' recreational vehicle owner.
Civil Code section 798.73 states:
798.73. The management shall not require the removal of a mobilehomefrom the park in the
event of its sale to a third party during the term of the homeowner's rental agreement. However,
in the event of a sale to a third pary, in order to upgrade the qualiy of the park, the management
may require that a mobilehome be removedfrom the park where:
'ARENTCON.SEALBCH.001.052499 SEAL BEACH TRAILER PARK AGENDA Page 4
I (a) It is not a "mobilehome"within the meaning of Section 798.3.
I Section 799.24 of the Code no longer refers to recreational vehicle, as this section was
superseded by Section 799.29:
I "Recreational vehicle"has the same meaning as d f ned in Section 18010 of the Health and
Safety Code. (As amended 1992).
ISince Seal Beach Trailer Park was constructed prior to January 1, 1982, recreational
vehicles may be situated within the mobilehome park amongst mobilehomes:
ISection 798.22 (a) In any new mobilehome park that is developed after January 1, 1982,
mobilehome spaces shall not be rented for the accommodation of recreational vehicles as defined
I by Section 799.24[comment: superseded by Section 799.29]unless the mobilehome park has
a specifically designated area within the park for recreational vehicles, which is separate and
apartfrom the area designated for mobilehomes. Recreational vehicles may be located only in
Ithe specifically designated area.
Even then,recreational vehicles can be scattered amongst mobilehome spaces within the
Ipark until the park is 75% occupied:
I Section 798.22 (b)Any new mobilehome park that is developed after January 1, 1982,
is not subject to the provisions of this section until 75% of the spaces have been rented for the
first time. Legally, mobilehomes are statutorily distinct from recreational vehicles (the statutory
I definitions includes the phrase "trailer"). Trailers are for human habitation, and the phrase
"habitation" adds nothing to the analysis.
IIt is significant that recreational vehicles, in a modern park, must be kept separate from
mobilehomes. Why? Because recreational vehicles are intended for transient use. In Lozano
I vs. Brant (1959) 172 C.A.2d 650, the court of appeal had occasioned to discuss the nature of
trailer occupancy. Said the court:
I "It would appear that it was the intent of the Legislature to prevent the permanent occupation
as dwelling places of facilities which do not conform to the requirements of Building Codes for
permanent structures. ... The eat of this legislation is similar to regulations by many states and
I municipalities which restrict the period of time that trailers may be parked or building occupied
in tourist and trailer camps to 90 days or other reasonably limited periods."
(172 C.A.2d at 656).
I
The purpose in restrictingresidencyto short periods of times is to protect the public
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health, safety and welfare. The intention of a trailer park is to allow for occupation by
Itransients. This recognition by the State is a clear-cut supersession of the intended uses for
trailer parks.
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IARF,rrrCON.Si ni BCH.001.052499 SEAL BEACH TRAILER PARK AGENDA Page 5
I "Such regulations are considered in the public interest and have been upheld as a proper exercise
of the police power in protecting the public health, safety, and morals by avoiding difficulties
inherent in the permanent accommodation of a large, mixed group of people confined to limited
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space and facilities primarily intended for transients alone."
Ia. (emphasis added).
I "trailers" is so well understood that great efforts are made to
Indeed, the phrase
distinguish such a transient occupancy unit from permanent or semipermanent mobilehomes.
IAll such structures were originally referred to as "trailers," but use of that term is now
assiduously avoided by everyone associated with mobilehomes, to get away from the
unfortunate image created by some of the early trailers" (2 Williams, American Land Planning
ILaw, Section 57.01).
I One of the leading consultants on land use control extensively involved in the problems
associated with mobilehomes, Frederick Bair, notes in defining mobilehomes:
I "Two things are of primag importance about that definition. The mobilehome is designed for
long-term occupancy, which distinguishes itfrom the travel trailer."
(citing, Bair, Local Regulation of Mobile Home Parks, Travel Trailer Parks, and Related
IFacilities, 12-13 (1965)).
I
As noted by the citing author:
This definition is thus contrasted with a definition of travel trailers, which are essentially
Iportable structures intended for travel and for temporary living purposes in connection therewith.
A leading text on the law of mobilehomes comprehensively discusses the travel trailer
Iand its relationship to the mobilehome housing industry. Hodes, The Law of Mobile Homes
(BNA 3d Ed.), Section 1.5, page 8 .
IThe Travel trailer is defined as follows:
I "Travel trailer"means a trailer primarily designed and constructed to provide temporary living
quarters for recreational camping or travel use; of such a size and weight as not to require
special highway movement permits when drawn by a motor vehicle;and towed by a motor vehicle
I using a connecting device between the travel trailer and the towing motor vehicle other than afifth
wheel connecting device.
I As a policy consideration, the travel trailer and mobilehomes serve different purposes
and should be separately regulated.
I "Travel trailers and mobilehomes serve different purposes, and should be separately regulated.
The essential difference between them is that travel trailers are designed for seasonal use and not
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SEAL BEACH TRAILER PARK AGENDA Page 6
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Ipermanent housing. . . The average cost of a travel trailer is less than one-third of that of a
mobilehome. It does not possess all of the facilities, is not intended as permanent habitation, and
I should not be treated as housing in the same category as a mobilehome. . . The courts are aware
of the distinction between a mobilehome and a travel trailer."
I This is not to denigrate a travel trailer phenomena in America. It is rarely recognized
that recreational vehicle life style exemplifies one of the best methods to explore the vast
expanse of the United States. In this sense, the phrase "transient" may actually be misplaced;
Ifor it is the elective choice of the travel trailer tenant to reside in a trailer, and not an economic
compulsion or effort to exploit affordable housing. With the increase in population and leisure,
recreational vehicles, travel trailers, and their kin are playing a rapidly growing role in
IAmerican recreational life,thereby creating substantial problems in the planning and regulatory
fields, such as specialized layouts of recreational areas and storage when not in use. The U.S.
I Department of Commerce, in outdoor recreation for America (Washington 1962), described
"driving for pleasure" as a form of outdoor recreation, and finds that it is the single most
popular recreational activity."
IIn describing recreational vehicle which are typically eight feet wide by thirty-two feet
in length or smaller, the authors of Shepards Mobile Homes reiterates the short-term residency
Inature of the recreational vehicle. "The smaller ypes of recreational vehicles, essentially movable housing
and the forerunner of mobilehomes, are designed and built for actualfrequent moving from place to place for the
I use of tourists, campers, and vacationers. In size they are generally eight feet or less in width and shorter than
32 feet. They contain sleeping and cooking facilities and range from wholly dependent on to independent of
outside washing and sanitary facilities, together with a supply of water,gas, and electricity. In comparison to
I the construction of fixed dwellings, their manufacture is similar to that of automobiles and trucks, with only a
few recentlyective standards established to assure quality materials and assembling."The authors feel the
difference arises from the fact that trailers are for "customary use" on the highways.
IEffective construction in a mobilehome may not necessarily give rise to the same risk of harm as
is foreseeable in putting together a defective vehicle for customary use on the highways.
I the recreational vehicle statutes
The park owner will be promoting the policy behindby
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demanding removal on sale.
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IAR ENTCON.SEALBCH.00 I.052499 SEAL BEACH TRAILER PARK AGENDA Page 7
III. THE COVENANT VIOLATES THE FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING
ACT (42 U.S.C. §3604, et seq.) AND §3.04 OF THE AMENDED
I DECLARATION, AND SUBJECTS THE CITY TO DAMAGES,
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, CIVIL PENALTIES AND PROSECUTION BY
THE UNITED STATES JUSTICE DEPARTMENT AND A CLASS OF
I
UNDERPRIVILEGED POTENTIAL RENTERS
Allowing a low income tenant to monetize a premium from another low income
Iprospective tenant in the form of increased market price for a trailer, excludes that portion
of the low income rental market with the least wealth. This process totally undermines the
I rent restrictions, because the undermarket lease is sold as a package to whomever has the
wealth to purchase the trailer and the undermarket lease at true market value. In the recent
example noted above, the combined trailer and lease value is offered at $65,000. A true low
I income tenant could not afford to spend$65,000 on the trailer any more than he could spend
$65,000 on an automobile. The right to live in a low rent community is therefore offered at
its true market value, thwarting the intent of the covenant. But it does much more.
IThe covenant discriminates, among lowincome potential renters on the basis of
I wealth. However, since the least wealthy people in society are non-white and female, the
covenant has the effect of discriminating on the basis of at least race, color, national origin
and sex. This in turn constitutes a violation of federal and state fair housing laws.
I "Effect based" discrimination occurs when a neutral policy causes discrimination
because the neutral policy has disparate results or secondary consequences which
Idiscriminate against protected classes of potential renters, without specific regard to the
treatment of the particular individual affected.
IA disparate impact claim (effect-based discrimination) analyzes a facialy neutral policy for
its differential impact or ffect on a protected group whereas disparate treatment claims focus
I upon derential treatment of similarly situated persons or groups.
Sobel v. Yeshiva Univ., 839 F.2d 18, 28 (2d Cir.1988).
IThis is a claim which may be brought by the housing provider. Treatment of a person
associated with a protected person will also constitute a violation of the Act. Consider
this Court's treatment of the Caucasian woman engaged to be married to an African-
IAmerican male:
I Indeed even ifJoseph had not been a prospective tenant (as he was) Sheila still would have
standing to sue under 1982 and 3604 for discrimination on the basis of her being engaged
to a black man. There is no doubt that the fair housing statutes confer broad standing and
I that white people have standing to sue for discriminatory housing practices that impair their
right to associate with people we other races. Treicante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409
US. 205, 93 S.Ct. 364, 34 L.Ed.2d 415 (1972) notes that by its terms Section 3610
I
ION 1 sCH.001.052499 SEAL BEACH TRAILER PARK AGENDA Page 8
grants the right to seek judicial relief to "[a]ny person who claims to have been injured by a
discriminatory housing practice.
' 93 S.Ct. at 366-7.
This is a claim which may be brought by the park owner,who has standing to assert
a discrimination claim on behalf of others. Halet v. Wend Investment (9th Cir. 1981) 672
F.2d 1305. In Halet, the tenant applied for an apartment in a complex owned by the Wend
Investment Company in Marina del Rey. His application was denied because Wend had an
' adults-only rental policy and Halet had a child in his household.
' Halet brought this suit against Wend and Los Angeles County, which leases the land
to Wend, charging that the adults-only rental policy violated his right to live with his family
and was racially discriminatory. Halet was white. He claimed that the County and Wend
' violated the fourteenth amendment, Civil rights statutes, 42 U.S.C. §§1981, 1982, 1983, and
2000d, and the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §3604. He sought a declaratory judgment that
the rental policy was unlawful and an injunction prohibiting such a policy.
' Halet's claims of racial discrimination were based on theg reater effect that an
adults-only policy has on Blacks and Hispanics because more of those households include
' minor children.
' Halet does, however, have standing to raise a racial discrimination claim under the Fair
Housing Act. Congress expanded standing under that Act to thefull extent of Artkle III. The
Supreme Court, in Gladstone Realtors v. Village(if Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100, 103
' n.9, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 1607-08, 1609-10 n.9 (1979), held that a plaintiff who has
suffered an actual injury is permitted to prove that the rights of another are infringed. [FN3J
Here, Halet claims that he was denied an apartment because of a policy that allegedly
infringes on the rights of Blacks and Hispanics. Under Gladstone this is sufficient to support
Halet's standing under the Act.
' [FN3. This extended to suits brought under 42 USC. §3612, such as this one, the
standing rule the Court had previously held applicable to suits brought under 42 U S C.
§3610, in Tricante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 US. 205, 93 S.Ct. 364, 34
L.Ed.2d 415 (1972). Gladstone. 441 US. at 96-97, 99 S.Ct. at 1606-07.]
' In this case, the requirement of greater wealth to obtain a low income space (because
the trailer purchase is tied to the access to the low income pad) is clearly and directly
discriminatory against females and minority groups, a greater proportional number of which
' are impoverished and in need for low income housing.
In United States v. City of Hayward, (N.D. Cal. 1992), the City of Hayward was
' prosecuted by the Justice Department for violating the Federal Fair Housing Act by
discriminating on the grounds of familial status. Hayward passed an ordinance prohibiting
,ARENrcoN.SEALBCH.00I.052499 SEAL BEACH TRAILER PARK AGENDA Page 9
I
Idiscrimination against families with children as well as a "vacancy decontrol ordinance"
which would free the park from rent restrictions on new residents. The landlord had issued
I new Park Rules and Regulations stating its intention to open the park to families with
children. Hayward asserted the landlord opened the park to families with children hoping
that it would cause its predominantly senior residents to leave, thereby allowing it to bring
in new tenants at increased rental rates. 167 seniors filed a petition with Hayward's Rent
Control Office claiming that opening the park to families with children amounted to a
reduction of services, entitling them to a reduction in rent pursuant to the rent control
Iordinance. Hayward accepted the seniors'petition for filing and assigned an arbitrator to hear
and decide the petition. The arbitrator concluded the petitioners were not precluded in their
I claims by the FHA,found there was a reduction in services and awarded rent reductions. The
landlord filed a housing discrimination complaint with the United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") against Hayward. HUD determined the
I complaint involved the legality of a state or local zoning or land use ordinance, and referred
the matter to the Attorney General. The United States then filed against Hayward, alleging
a violation of 42 U.S.C. §3617 for coercing and interfering with the landlord on account of
tits efforts to aid families with children to enjoy their protected rights under the FHA.
I
The Court awarded summary judgment against the City.
In this case,the ambit of 42 U.S.C. §3604(a)(which provides that"it shall be unlawful
to refuse to sell or rent ... to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status,
or national origin") comes into play. The covenant as a land use regulation, discriminates on
the basis of race, color national origin and sex because the low income rents which may be
Ifreely alienated at full fair market value discriminates against the least wealthy low income
renter class which in turn offends the FHA.
IProper claims for relief in an enforcement action by the Attorney General are stated
in 42 U.S.C. §3614(d). §3614(d)(1) provides:
IIn a civil action under ... this section, the court (A) may award such preventive relief;
including a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order against the
I person responsible for a violation of this subchapter as is necessary to assure thefull enjoyment
of the rights granted by this subchapter; (B) may award such other relief as the court deems
appropriate, including monetary damages to persons aggrieved; and(C) may, to vindicate the
I public interest, assess a civil penalty against the respondent (i) in an amount not exceeding
$50,000,for a first violation; and (ii) in an amount not exceeding $'100,000,for any
subsequent violation.
I Each low income renter denied a chance to
P P on artici ate equal grounds with other renters
I in the class because of the inability to afford the housing unit and to pay fair market value for
the undermarket leasehold is deprived of the guaranteed rights to equal opportunity housing.
This class may range into the thousands. A class action of this nature may, at the rate of
I
ARENTCONSEALBCH.001.1152499 SEAL BEACH TRAILER PARK AGENDA Page 10
I
I $50,000 per violation, constitute a compensatory class award of hundreds of millions of
dollars. While such damages were not granted in the Hayward case, attorneys fees are
I permitted to the prevailing party. And, the facts are very different in the Hayward case then
in the instant matter.
IThe statistical evidence is beyond any reasonable dispute.According to the UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, Economic & Statistics Administration:
IIn 1997,the number and poverty rate of African Americans was 9.1 million and 26.5
percent, compared with 24.4 million and 11.0 percent for Whites; 1.5 million and 14.0
I percent for Asians and Pacific Islanders; and 8.3 million and 27.1 percent for Hispanics. The
poverty rate for Hispanics did not differ statistically from the rate for African Americans.
I For families, the number and percentage of poor in 1997 was 2.0 million and 23.6
percent for African Americans; 5.0 million and 8.4 percent for Whites; 244,000 and 10.2
percent for Asians and Pacific Islanders; and 1.7 million and 24.7 percent for Hispanics. The
Ipoverty rate for Hispanics did not differ statistically from the rate for African Americans.
African American families with a female householder, no husband present,who are
poor are as follows: 1.6 million and 39.8 percent in 1997, down from 1.7 million and 43.7
percent in 1996.
In 1997,African American households had a median income of$25,050, lower than
that of Asian and Pacific Islander households ($45,249), White households ($38,972) and
I
households maintained by a person of Hispanic origin,who may be of any race, ($26,628).
African American households had an average income per household member of
I $11,998, based on an average household size of 2.75 people. The average for White
households was $20,093,with an average size of 2.58 people; and the estimate for Asian and
I
Pacific Islander households was $18,569, with an average size of 3.17 people.
The per capita income of African Americans was $12,351 in 1997, compared with
I $20,425 for Whites, $18,226 for Asian and Pacific Islanders, and $10,773 for Hispanics.
Whites are nearly twice as wealthy as minorities, and have much lower rates of
Ihomeownership. This census bureau statistical brief follows.
Moreover, the effect of the failed, so-called, low and moderate income housing
Irequirement has had an effect which is especially acute when the minority class status is
compounded. According to census statistics, there is not a single black female with children
I as head of household in the entire city. Relative wealth measured in assets and
homeownership clearly favors whites. Obviously, Seal Beach Trailer Park does not serve the
needs of the community.
I
IAIt1iNI'C ON.Sent sCH.001.052499 SEAL BEACH TRAILER PARK AGENDA Page 11
I _
I Bureaustatist]. al
1 of the
Census Brief
I
1
Housing in Metropolitan Areas —
--
Black Households
' In 1990, 10 million of our Nation's New York had the highest number ....but Jackson had the highest
households had a Black household- of Black households.... percentage.
er.Most of them(8.5 million, or New York,NY(762,309);Chicago, In Jackson,MS,37 percent of •
85 percent)lived in a metropolitan IL(439,938);Washington,DC-MD- householders were Black—the
area(MA). These metropolitan VA(371,387);Los Angeles-Long highest percentage of any of the top
Black households are the focus of Beach,CA(352,679);and Detroit, 50 MA's.Memphis,TN-AR-MS(36
1 this Brief which compares their MI(329,319)had more Black percent)and New Orleans,LA(31
housing characteristics with those households than any other metro percent)followed closely.All in all,
of metropolitan households with areas.Combined,these five MA's there were 10 MA's in the top 50
White householders. accounted for about 1 in 4 metro- where Blacks accounted for at least
i The MA's used in this Brief one of politan Black households.(See one-quarter of all householders.All
a series on housing in metropolitan table on page 3.)Three in four lived 10 were in the South.
areas, correspond to the definitions in one of the 50 MA's that had more
1 that were in place in 1990. The than 40,000 Black households.(In Black homeownership rate
count of 335 MA's equals the total this Brief,these metro areas are re- differed substantially among
number of MSA's(metropolitan sta- ferred to as the"top 50"MA's.) metro areas.
tistical areas)and PMSA's(primary Twenty-six of these MA's were lo- Nationally,homeownership eluded
I
metropolitan statistical areas). cated in the South;seven were most metro Black householders.
PMSA's are aggregated into consol- found in either Georgia or the Caro- Only about 4 in 10 were owners,
idated metropolitan statistical linas. much lower than the 2 in 3 metro
I
areas, which are not discussed in
this Brief
The majority of Black households
Blacks Were Less Likely to Be Homeowners
lived in central cities. Percent of householders who owned the home they lived in,
by metropolitan location and race: 1990
More than half(59 percent)of the
Nation's Black households lived in ll Black g3
White 73% 74%
central cities of metropolitan areas; =
I
another quarter(25 percent)resided
IA
in the suburbs.Nearly 1 in 59% .
,,,'
1
4„
r
8 metro area householders(12 per- 54%
I cent)were Black.This proportion 50% kk
was much higher in central cities t
i, '
(20 percent)than in the suburbs 37% I `.
(6 percent). c
,
e e``'�. E
•
1 ' r .
SB/95-5
Issued March 1995I '"
Metro area Outside metro
U.S.Department of Commerce (central city) (suburb) area
Economics and Statistics Administration Metro area
BUREAU OF THE CENSUSxi ;'4X95W-2:4 IL— ..,:- . 41111A,PI_We
IBUREAU OF THE CENSUS STATISTICAL BRIEF March 1995
I
White householders.(The gap
was wider in the suburbs than in cen-
tral Crowded Homes Were More Common for Blacks
cities,as the graph on page 1 Percent of households with more than one
' shows.)Among the top 50 MA's, person per room,by metropolitan location
Black homeownership rates ranged and race of householder: 1990 ® Black
from 62 percent in Nassau-Suffolk,
WhiteI
NY,to 21 percent in neighboring
I
New York,NY.Within the top 50 Metro area 10%MA's that had heavy concentrations (central city) 4%
of Black households(one quarter or
more of all households),Charleston, Metro area 9%
USC(57 percent)and Jackson,MS(54 (suburb) 2%
percent)led the way.(See table on
page 3.)There wasn't a single metro Outside metro 11%
I
area in the United States where area 2%
Blacks were as likely as Whites to
own their home. But among the top
50,those in Charleston,SC,came the
1 closest(57 percent compared with 65
percent). Home Values Were Lower for Blacks in
Central Cities and Suburbs Alike
Median value of homes,by metropolitan location
II
I
Black
Black households were larger.... white
Nationally,metro Black households and race of owner: 1990
contained a median of 2.50 persons, Metro area $47,800
higher than the 2.23 in metro White (central city) $75,800
I
households.Black households in cen-
tral cities were smaller than those in Metro area $72,900
the suburbs(2.42 versus 2.71 per- (suburb) $99,400
0
I
sons).The corresponding medians for
White households were lower(2.03 400
in central cities,2.34 in the suburbs). Outside metro
area $51,400
Of the top 50 MA's,Nassau-Suffolk,
I
NY(3.30);Ft.Lauderdale-Holly-
wood-Pompano Beach,FL(2.95)and :' Y:; 4Vr4 > L, . M
Miami-Hialeah,FL(2.90)had the
' largest Black households.(See table Black owned homes had a median The typical metro Black renters
on page 3.) value of$55,500,nearly 40 percent spent less on rent than their
lower than that of homes owned by White counterparts.
....and more likely to be crowded. Whites($91,700).(See table on Contract rent refers to the monthly
I
Households with more than one per- page 4.) rent agreed to,or contracted for,re-
son per room are considered gardless of any furnishings,
"crowded"Within MA's,Black Among the top 50 MA's,the most utilities,or services that may be in-
households were more likely than expensive Black owned homes eluded. In this Brief,rent data are
White households to face this prob- (median values exceeding for all renter-occupied homes,ex-
lem(10 percent versus 3 percent). $150,000)were found in San Fran- cept one-family houses on 10 or
(See graph at top right) cisco,CA;Boston,MA;New York, more acres.The census also pro-
' Miami and Ft.Lauderdale,where NY;and Nassau-Suffolk,NY.Me- vides data on gross rent—the con-
more than 1 in 5 Black households dian home values were lower for tract rent plus the estimated average
were crowded, led the top 50 MA's. Blacks than for Whites in each of monthly cost of utilities if these are
' (See table on page 3.) the top 50 MA's.Blacks came clos- paid for by the renter.Data on gross
est to parity in Riverside-San rent were collected from a sample
Blacks owned lower-valued homes. Bernardino,CA($127,900,6 per- of households. See"Housing in
cent lower than the median of Metropolitan Areas—Renter Fi-
' Value is the owner's estimate of how $135,400 for Whites).The gap was nancial Characteristics,"Statistical
much their property would sell for if largest,meanwhile,in Philadelphia, Brief 94-19, for metro area rankings
it were on the market. (Value data in PA-NJ,where median home values by gross rent for areas with 1 mil-
this Brief are for single-family homes were 68 percent lower for Blacks lion or more persons.
I
on less than 10 acres with no com than for Whites and in Detroit,MI,
mercial establishment or medical of where they were 61 percent less. Within metro areas,Black rent-
fice on the property.)In metro areas, (See table on page 4.) ers paid a median of$329 in
1 .
MP
IBUREAU OF THE CENSUS STATISTICAL BRIEF March 1995
I contract rent,while Whites
spent$414.In the suburbs, The Top 50 Metro Areas-An Overview
though,this difference nar-
rowed considerably($420 for Selected household and housing characteristics for Black householders: United States by
I
inside and outside metropolitan areas and the 50 metropolitan areas(MA's)with the highest
Blacks compared with$443 for number of Black households:1990
Whites). Percent Median Percent
Percent who number of who
Among Black renters,the most Number of all owned persons lived in a
I expensive median housing costs
in the top 50 MA's were evident of Black house- their in crowded
households Rank holds home households home
in the Nassau-Suffolk,NY United States 9,976,161 - 10.8 43.4 2.52 9.8
I ($637);San Diego,CA($530); Inside metropolitan area 8,455,952 - 11.9 40.6 2.50 9.7
In central city 5,925,383 19.9 36.6 2.42 10.0
and Los Angeles-Long Beach, Not in central city 2,530,569 6.1 50.0 •-" 2.71 8.9
CA($522)metro areas.At the Outside metropolitan area 1,520,209 - 7.4 58.9 2.65 10.5 ?:
other extreme were a pair of Top 50 MA's 6,334,069
I
areas in Alabama-Mobile Atlanta,GA 253,881 7 24.0 40.4 2.52 7.8 `?4
and Birmingham-where their Augusta,GA-SC 40,187 50 28.2 51.7 2.68 8.8
median rent was below$200. Baltimore,9 D 206,989 9 23.5 39.4 2.55 6.3
Baton Roue,LA 49,222 39 26.1 52.8 2.81 11.1
I .
information: Birmingham,AL 84,864 20 24.6 53.3 2.51 6.3
Boston,MA 70,642 24 6.5 24.7 2.44 10.1
Subject Summary Tape File 7 Buffalo,NY 42,585 45 11.3 34.2 2.16 3.2 „.
(Metropolitan Housing Charac- Charleston,SC 47,439 41 26.7 57.1 2.87 9.5 r
teristics)presents 1990 census Charlotte-Gastonia-
' Rock Hill,NC-SC 77,588 21 17.6 43.8 2.62 8.7
data for States and MA's.Data Chicago,IL 439,938 2 19.8 37.1 2.56 9.4
are presented on various social, Cincinnati,OH-KY-IN 71,050 22 13.0 33.1 2.23 5.7
physical housing,and financial Cleveland,OH 131,799 14 18.5 42.2 2.30 3.4
Columbia,SC 42,435 46 26.0 50.3 2.72 8.5
I characteristics of Black house Columbus,OH 58,021 33 11.1 38.9 2.32 4.5
holds.SSTF 7 comes Dallas,TX 140,359 13 14.7 37.9 2.57 12.0
on both computer tape and CD- Dayton-Springfield OH 45,808 42 12.6 47.3 2.30 4.2
Detroit,MI 329,319 5 20.3 48.7 2.42 6.0
ROM.Call Customer Ft.Lauderdale Hollywood
' Services(301-457-4100)for Pompano Beach,FL 58,627 32 11.1 44.9 2.95 22.4
more information on 1990 Fort WorthAriington,TX 49,044 40 9.9 43.9 2.56 10.5 ;y
Gary-Hammond,IN 40,312 49 18.7 50.8 2.50 7.0 4:
census products. Greensboro-Winston-
t Contacts: Salem-High Point,NC 65,701 25 17.7 41.3 2.37 5.1
Houston,TX 209,183 8 17.6 43.1 2.53 11.1
Housing of Blacks- Indianapolis,IN 61,838 31 12.9 42.5 2.36 5.9
Jeanne Woodward Jacksonville,FL 61,898 30 18.0 50.2 2.50 10.9
' 301-763-8148 Jackson,MS 51,671 37 36.9 54.0 2.82 12.2
Kansas City,MO KS 70,728 23 11.7 46.7 2.38 6.5
Statistical Briefs- Los Angeles
Robert Bernstein Long Beach,CA 352,679 4 11.8 36.5 2.33 14.0
301 457-1221 Louisville,KY-IN 45,589 43 12.4 42.7 2.36 5.9
I
Memphis,TN-AR-MS
This Brief is one of a series that presents Miami-Hialeah,FL 128,620 16 36.0 47.9
120,321 17 17.4 43.7 2.72 10.3 2.90 25.9
information of current interest.It ex-
Milwaukee,WI 62,092 29 11.5 30.3 2.79 8.4
'
amines data from the 1990 census. Mobile,AL 42,225 47 24.3 54.8 2.75 9.5
Some of the data items from the census Nashville,TN 53,671 35 14.3 41.7 2.39 6.2
'
were collected from every household. Nassau Suffolk,NY
Other data came from additional ques- New Orleans,LA51,737 36 6.0 61.5
140,834 12 30.9 4a9 3.30 11.0 2.69 12.3
New York,NY 762,309 1 23.4 20.8 2.45 16.4
tions asked of a sample of households. Newark,NJ 140,895 11 21.6 30.9 2.51 11.1
Since all the data in this Brief came Norfolk-Virginia Beach-
I from the questions asked of all house- Newport News,VA 131,545 15 26.7 42.3 2.59 7.0
holds,the statistics in it are not subject Oakland,CA 111,281 18 14.3 36.7 2.28 9.3
to sampling variability. Orlando,FL 41,461 48 10.3 46.0 2.78 13.0
Philadelphia,PA-NJ 315,557 6 17.8 55.5 2.44 6.5
1 Pittsburgh,PA
Raleigh-Durham,NC 63,548 27 7.7 38.9 2.22 3.5
65,458 26 22.8 41.4 2.35 6.1
Richmond Petersburg,VA 88,800 19 26.8 49.0 2.42 4.7 ;,,
Data for Other b1A's Riverside- �_
1
The tables in this Brief contain data San Bernardino,CA 53,833 34 62 45.5 2.88 11.5
' only for the 50 metro areas with the San Diego,CA 50,219 38 5.7 28.4 2.58 12.7
highest number of Black house- San Francesco,CA 44,167 44 6.9 31.5 2.16 11.2 ;
holds.However,the information we. St.Louis,MO-IL 144,221 10 15.6 45.3 2.48 8.1
show in them is available at a small Tampa St.Petersburg
' charge for all 335 metropolitan Clearwater,FL 63,035 28 7.2 45.4 2.51 12.1
areas.To order these printouts,cal Washington,DC-MD-VA 371,387 3 25.4 41.1 235 8.2
Jeanne Woodward(301-763-8148}, 4
`St ' :T'r4-",*i:-!1''•-A"''t,ig .:<£`Pte' ;- L.••:fY„ .7"4'-_. t:-.-.' `'?
mi
IBUREAU OF THE CENSUS STATISTICAL BRIEF March 1995
IThe Top 50 Metro Areas-Home Value and Rent
Selected financial housing characteristics for Black and White householders:United States by inside and outside metropolitan areas
1 I and the 50 metropolitan areas(MA's)with the highest number of Black households: 1990
Median home value Value ratio Median contract rent
I
Blacks Whites Black:White - Blacks Whites
United States $50,700 $80,200 0.63 $312 $382
Inside metropolitan area $55,500 $91,700 0.61 $329 $414
I
In central city $47,800 $75,800 0.63 $307 $390
Not in central city $72,900 $99,400 0.73 $420 $443
Outside metropolitan area $34,400 $51,400 0.67 $161 $246
Top 50 MA's
Atlanta,GA $66,700 $94,000 0.71 $390 $476
Augusta,GA SC $47,700 $68,500 0.70 $235 $330
Baltimore, MD $57,100 $109,900 0.52 $325 $453
Baton Rouge, LA $45,900 $71,500 0.64 $221 $311
Birmingham,AL $38,900 $66,200 0.59 $176 $307
Boston,MA $160,200 $186,600 0.86 $501 $593
Buffalo,NY $38,500 $75,200 0.51 $233 $312
Charleston,SC $52,800 $77,600 0.68 $263 $373
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill,NC-SC $49,900 $76,100 0.66 $270 $358
i Chicago, IL $64,100 $118,900 0.54 $355 $480
Cincinnati,OH-KY-IN $54,400 $72,000 0.76 $249 $326
Cleveland, OH $45,500 $77,500 0.59 $261 $366
Columbia,SC $53,200 $78,200 0.68 $287 $367
1 Columbus, OH $50,400 $73,700 0.68 $291 $353
Dallas,TX $57,000 $86,700 0.66 $352 $415
Dayton-Springfield,OH $42,100 $66,700 0.63 $250 $321
Detroit, MI $29,200 $74,200 0.39 $267 $426
I
Ft.Lauderdale-Hollywood-
Pompano Beach, FL $67,300 $94,400 0.71 $412 $519
Fort Worth-Arlington,TX $47,600 $74,500 0.64 $325 $372
Gary-Hammond, IN $34,200 $62,600 0.55 $222 $337
1 Greensboro-Winston-Salem-
High Point,NC $53,700 $74,000 0.73 $266 $317
Houston,TX $43,200 $70,100 0.62 $296 $366
Indianapolis, IN $41,000 $69,300 0.59 $290 $355
I
Jacksonville, FL $41,500 $72,200 0.57 $284 $383
Jackson, MS $42,100 $69,100 0.61 $218 $362
Kansas City,MO KS $37,600 $68,700 0.55 $272 $363
Los Angeles-Long Beach,CA $143,500 $246,600 0.58 $522 $603
Louisville, KY-IN $34,800 $58,300 0.60 $225 $291
I
Memphis,TN-AR-MS $44,500 $74,600 0.60 $222 $366
Miami-Hialeah, FL $62,800 $91,900 0.68 $353 $445
Milwaukee, WI $40,600 $78,400 0.52 $305 $401
Mobile,AL $38,500 $60,300 0.64 $158 $273
I
Nashville,TN $57,100 $78,200 0.73 $282 $365
Nassau Suffolk,NY $152,600 $188,800 0.81 $637 $692
New Orleans,LA $56,300 $73,900 0.76 $252 $340
New York,NY $159,900 $222,400 0.72 $406 $495
I
Newark,NJ $132,400 $196,400 0.67 $452 $559
Norfolk-Virginia Beach-
Newport News,VA $66,300 $90,600 0.73 $329 $438
Oakland,CA $138,100 $234,400 0.59 $502 $626
I
Orlando,FL $59,400 $85,300 0.70 $368 $459
Philadelphia, PA NJ $36,200 $112,400 0.32 $319 $476
Pittsburgh,PA $36,200 $55,700 0.65 $225 $297
Raleigh-Durham, NC $63,400 $98,100 0.65 $316 $408
' Richmond-Petersburg,VA $57,300 $85,300 0.67 $296 $423
Riverside-San Bernardino,CA $127,900 $135,400 0.94 $502 $502
San Diego,CA $129,700 $192,900 0.67 $530 $581
San Francisco,CA $223,200 $348,200 0.64 $515 $697
St. Louis, MO-IL $43,800 $72,600 0.60 $250 $344
I
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater,FL $47,000 $72,700 0.65 $289 $388
Washington,DC-MD-VA $111,700 $180,500 0.62 $518 $684
1990 Census Lookup(1.4a) hrip://venus.census.gov/cdrom/lookup/928017392
(no URL reload available)
I1990 US Census Data
Database: C9OSTF3A
Summary Level:State--Place
ISeal Beach city: FIPS.STATE=06, FIPS.PLACE90=70686
PERSONS
II Universe: Persons
Total 25098
SEX
Universe: Persons
II
Male 10970
Female 14128
RACE
Universe: Persons
White 23525
II
Black 168
American Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut 47
Asian or Pacific Islander 1035
Other race 323
II
RACE -
Universe: Persons
White (800-869, 971) 23525
Black (870-934, 972) 168
American Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut (000-599, 935-970, 973-975) :
I
American Indian (000-599, 973) 33
Eskimo (935-940, 974) 14
Aleut (941-970, 975) 0
Asian or Pacific Islander (600-699, 976-985):
Asian (600-652, 976, 977, 979-982, 985) :
II
Chinese (605-607, 976) 282
Filipino (608, 977) 144
Japanese (611, 981) 343
Asian Indian (600, 982) 55
Korean (612, 979) 111
II
Vietnamese (619, 980) 42
Cambodian (604) 0
Hmong (609) 0
Laotian (613) 0
Thai (618) 4
IIOther Asian (601-603, 610, 614-617, 620-652, 985) 23
Pacific Islander (653-699, 978, 983, 984) :
Polynesian (653-659, 978, 983):
Hawaiian (653, 654, 978) 16
II Samoan
(655, 983) U0Tongan (657)
Other Polynesian (656, 658, 659)Mcronesian (660-675, 984) :
Guamanian (660, 984) 15
II
Other Micronesian (661-675) 0
Melanesian (676-680) 0
Pacific Islander, not specified (681-699) 0
Other race (700-799, 986-999) 323
PERSONS OF HISPANIC ORIGIN
II
Universe: Persons of Hispanic origin
Total 1214
HISPANIC ORIGIN
Universe: Persons
Not of Hispanic origin (000-001, 006-199) 23884
IIHispanic origin (002-005, 200-999) :
Mexican (002, 210-220) 803
Puerto Rican (003, 261-270) 32
Cuban (004, 271-274) 44
II
Other Hispanic (005, 200-209, 221-260, 275-999) :
Dominican (Dominican Republic) (275-289) 0
Central American (221-230) : 18
Guatemalan (222)
Honduran (223) 0
II
Nicaraguan (224) 61
Panamanian (225) 6
Salvadoran (226) 31
Other Central American (221, 227-230) 10
South American (231-249) :
II
Colombian (234) 7
Ecuadorian (235) 5
Peruvian (237) 5
Other South American (231-233, 236, 238-249) 79
II
Other Hispanic (005, 200-209, 250-260, 290-999) 113
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1990 Census Lookup(1.4a) http://venus.census.gov/cdrom/lookup/928017392
HISPANIC ORIGIN BY RACE
II
Universe: Persons
Not of Hispanic origin:
White 22637
Black 168
American Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut 47
II
Asian or Pacific Islander 1008
Other race 24
Hispanic origin:
White 888
Black 0
I
American Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut 0
Asian or Pacific Islander 27
Other race 299
RACE BY SEX BY AGE
II
Universe: White males
Under 1 year 50
1 and 2 years 163
3 and 4 years 122
5 years 58
II
6 years 78
7 to 9 years 259
10 and 11 years 117
12 and 13 years 157
14 years 47
II
15 years 92
16 years 110
17 years 76
18 years 97
19 years 67
II20 years 100
21 years 91
22 to 24 years 407
25 to 29 years 743
II
30 to 34 years 848
35 to 39 years 631
40 to 44 years 678
45 to 49 years 687
50 to 54 years 612
II
55 to 59 years 527
60 and 61 years 206
62 to 64 years 306
65 to 69 years 723
70 to 74 years 696
II75 to 79 years 525
80 to 84 years 637
85 years and over 413
RACE BY SEX BY AGE
II
Universe: White females
Under 1 year 73
1 and 2 years 198
3 and 4 years 104
5 years 36
II
6 years 84
7 to 9 years 195
10 and 11 years 163
12 and 13 years 126
14 years 79
II
15 years 120
16 years 56
17 years 49
18 years 77
II
19 years 99
20 years 95
21 years 132
22 to 24 years 309
25 to 29 years 725
II
30 to 34 years 649
35 to 39 years 621
40 to 44 years 739
45 to 49 years 665
50 to 54 years 485
II
55 to 59 years 445
60 and 61 years 302
62 to 64 years 460
65 to 69 years 1114
70 to 74 years 1157
I
75 to 79 years 1368
80 to 84 years 1310
85 years and over 1167
RACE BY SEX BY AGE
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1990 Census Lookup(1.4a) http://venus.census.gov/cdrom/lookup/928017392
Universe: Black males ,
Under 1 year 0
II
1 and 2 years 30
3 and 4 years 9
5 years 0
6 years 0
II7 to 9 years 0
10 and 11 years 0
12 and 13 years 0
14 years 0
15 years 0
II
16 years 0
17 years 0
18 years 4
19 years 0
20 years 0
111 21 years 0
22 to 24 years 0
25 to 29 years 46
30 to 34 years 0
I
35 to 39 years 0
40 to 44 years 0
45 to 49 years 14
50 to 54 years 4
55 to 59 years 0
I
60 and 61 years 0
62 to 64 years 0
65 to 69 years 7
70 to 74 years 0
75 to 79 years 0
II80 to 84 years 0
85 years and over 0
RACE BY SEX BY AGE
Universe: Black females
II
Under 1 year 0
1 and 2 years 9
3 and 4 years 0
5 years 0
6 years 0
I
7 to 9 years 0
10 and 11 years 0
12 and 13 years 0
14 years 0
15 years 6
II
16 years 0
17 years 0
18 years 0
19 years 0
II
20 years 0
21 years 0
22 to 24 years 9
25 to 29 years 21
30 to 34 years 0
II
35 to 39 years 0
40 to 44 years 0
45 to 49 years 0
50 to 54 years 0
55 to 59 years 0
II
60 and 61 years 0
62 to 64 years 0
65 to 69 years 0
70 to 74 years 0
75 to 79 years 9
I
80 to 84 years 0
85 years and over 0
RACE BY SEX BY AGE
Universe: American Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut males
II
Under 1 year 0
1 and 2 years 0
3 and 4 years 0
5 years 0
6 years 0
II
7 to 9 years 0
10 and 11 years 0
12 and 13 years 0
14 years 0
15 years 0
II16 years 0
17 years 0
18 years 0
19 years 0
111
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1990 Census Lookup(1.4a) http://venus.census.gov/cdrom/lookup/928017392
20 years 3
I
21 years 4
22 to 24 years 0
25 to 29 years 0
30 to 34 years 0
35 to 39 years 0
II
40 to 44 years 3
45 to 49 years 0
50 to 54 years 0
55 to 59 years 0
60 and 61 years 0
II
62 to 64 years 7
65 to 69 years 0
70 to 74 years 0
75 to 79 years 0
' 80 to 84 years 0
85 years and over 0
RACE BY SEX BY AGE
Universe: American Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut females
Under 1 year 0
II
1 and 2 years 0
3 and 4 years 0
5 years 0
6 years 0
7 to 9 years 0
II
10 and 11 years 0
12 and 13 years 0
14 years 0
15 years 0
II
16 years 0
17 years 0
18 years 0
19 years 0
20 years 0
II
21 years 0
22 to 24 years 0
25 to 29 years 0
30 to 34 years 0
35 to 39 years 0
I
40 to 44 years 3
45 to 49 years 14
50 to 54 years 0
55 to 59 years 0
60 and 61 years 0
II62 to 64 years 0
65 to 69 years 0
70 to 74 years 2
75 to 79 years 0
II
80 to 84 years 0
85 years and over 11
RACE BY SEX BY AGE
Universe: Asian or Pacific Islander males
Under 1 year 0
II
1 and 2 years 22
3 and 4 years 20
5 years 7
6 years 3
7 to 9 years 14
II
10 and 11 years 21
12 and 13 years 18
14 years 13
15 years 14
II 16 years 0
17 years 2
18 years 7
19 years 0
20 years 6
II 21 years 0
22 to 24 years 26
25 to 29 years 17
30 to 34 years 35
35 to 39 years 31
II
40 to 44 years 28
45 to 49 years 34
50 to 54 years 53
55 to 59 years 29
II
60 and 61 years 5
62 to 64 years 4
65 to 69 years 2
70 to 74 years 0
75 to 79 years 0
I
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1990 Census Lookup(1.4a) http://venus.census.gov/cdrom/lookup/928017392
80 to 84 years 0
85 years and over 8
•
I
RACE BY SEX BY AGE
Universe: Asian or Pacific Islander females
Under 1 year 3
1 and 2 years 8
I
3 and 4 years 10
5 years 4
6 years 18
7 to 9 years 12
10 and 11 years 0
I
12 and 13 years 0
14 years 15
15 years 6
16 years 6
II
17 years 7
18 years 28
19 years 12
20 years 20
21 years 5
II 22 to 24 years 28
25 to 29 years 55
30 to 34 years 60
35 to 39 years 61
40 to 44 years 44
II
45 to 49 years 52
50 to 54 years 40
55 to 59 years 0
60 and 61 years 16
II
62 to 64 years 28
65 to 69 years 37
70 to 74 years 8
75 to 79 years 8
80 to 84 years 25
II 85 years and over 0
RACE BY SEX BY AGE
Universe: Other race males
Under 1 year 0
1 and 2 years 0
II
3 and 4 years 3
5 years 0
6 years 0
7 to 9 years 0
10 and 11 years 6
II12 and 13 years 0
14 years 8
15 years 0
16 years 0
II17 years 0
18 years 0
19 years 0
20 years 8
21 years 0
I 22 to 24 years 20
25 to 29 years 7
30 to 34 years 13
35 to 39 years 0
40 to 44 years 19
II
45 to 49 years 0
50 to 54 years 6
55 to 59 years 7
60 and 61 years 0
II
62 to 64 years 0
65 to 69 years 0
70 to 74 years 0
75 to 79 years 0
80 to 84 years 0
I 85 years and over 0
RACE BY SEX BY AGE
Universe: Other race females
Under 1 year 0
1 and 2 years 0
II
3 and 4 years 11
5 years 0
6 years 0
7 to 9 years 16
I 10 and 11 years 0
12 and 13 years 11
14 years 8
15 years 0
16 years 8
I
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1990 Census Lookup(I.4a) http://venus.census.gov/cdrom/lookup/928017392
17 years 0
II
18 years 0
19 years 0
20 years 0
21 years 0
22 to 24 years 15
I
25 to 29 years 72
30 to 34 years 31
35 to 39 years 8
40 to 44 years 7
I45 to 49 years 3
50 to 54 years 18
55 to 59 years 0
60 and 61 years 9
62 to 64 years 0
II65 to 69 years 0
70 to 74 years 9
75 to 79 years 0
80 to 84 years 0
85 years and over 0
I
SEX BY AGE
Universe: Males of Hispanic origin
Under 1 year 4
1 and 2 years 0
3 and 4 years 14
II
5 years 0
6 years 0
7 to 9 years 22
10 and 11 years 16
II
12 and 13 years 26
14 years 14
15 years 0
16 years 4
17 years 0
II
18 years 15
19 years 0
20 years 30
21 years 11
22 to 24 years 44
II
25 to 29 years 65
30 to 34 years 52
35 to 39 years 14
40 to 44 years 19
II
45 to 49 years 35
50 to 54 years 44
55 to 59 years 24
60 and 61 years 19
62 to 64 years 6
t 65 to 69 years 0
70 to 74 years 18
75 to 79 years 14
80 to 84 years 0
85 years and over 8
II
SEX BY AGE
Universe: Females of Hispanic origin
Under 1 year 0
1 and 2 years 24
3 and 4 years 17
II
5 years 8
6 years 0
7 to 9 years 34
10 and 11 years 6
II
12 and 13 years 19
14 years 20
15 years 9
16 years 19
17 years 0
II
18 years 0
19 years 10
20 years 21
21 years 0
22 to 24 years 43
II
25 to 29 years 130
30 to 34 years 91
35 to 39 years 48
40 to 44 years 36
II
45 to 49 years 29
50 to 54 years 29
55 to 59 years 14
60 and 61 years 25
62 to 64 years 12
I
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1990 Census Lookup(1.4a) http://venus.census.gov/cdrom/lookup/9280I7392
65 to 69 years 9
II
70 to 74 years 23
75 to 79 years 4
80 to 84 years 10
85 years and over 6
HOUSEHOLD TYPE AND PRESENCE AND AGE OF CHILDREN
I
Universe: Households
Family households:
Married-couple family:
With own children under 18 years 1433
No own children under 18 years 4008
II Other family:
Male householder, no wife present:
With own children under 18 years 44
No own children under 18 years 90
IIFemale householder, no husband present:
With own children under 18 years 253
No own children under 18 years 398
Nonfamily households 7131
RACE OF HOUSEHOLDER SY HOUSEHOLD TYPE AND PRESENCE AND AGE OF
II
OF CHILDREN
Universe: Households
White:
Family households:
Married-couple family:
With own children under 18 years 1284
No own children under 18 years 3875
Other family:
Male householder, no wife present:
With own children under 18 years 44
II No own children under 18 years 90
Female householder, no husband present:
With own children under 18 years 208
No own children under 18 years 390
Nonfamily households 6929
II Black:
Family households:
Married-couple family:
With own children under 18 years 24
II
No own children under 18 years 25
Other family:
Male householder, no wife present:
With own children under 18 years 0
No own children under 18 years 0
I
Female householder, no husband present:
With own children under 18 years 0
No own children under 18 years 0
Nonfamily households 24
American Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut:
II
Family households:
Married-couple family:
With own children under 18 years 0
No own children under 18 years 3
Other family:
II
Male householder, no wife present:
With own children under 18 years 0
No own children under 18 years 0
Female householder, no husband present:
With own children under 18 years 0
II
No own children under 18 years 0
Nonfamily households 20
Asian or Pacific Islander:
Family households:
Married-couple family:
II
With own children under 18 years 112
No own children under 18 years 86
Other family:
Male householder, no wife present:
IIWith own children under 18 years 0
No own children under 18 years 0
Female householder, no husband present:
With own children under 18 years 31
No own children under 18 years 8
II
Nonfamily households 120
Other race:
Family households:
Married-couple family:
With own children under 18 years 13
II
No own children under 18 years 19
Other family:
Male householder, no wife present:
With own children under 18 years 0
No own children under 18 years 0
II
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1990 Census Lookup(1.4a) http://venus.census.gov/cdrom/lookup/928017392
Female householder, no husband present:
With own children under 18 years 14
I No own children under 18 years 0
Nonfamily households 38
HOUSEHOLD TYPE AND PRESENCE AND AGE OF CHILDREN
Universe: Households with householder of Hispanic origin
I
Family households:
Married-couple family:
With own children under 18 years 75
No own children under 18 years 115
Other family:
II Male householder, no wife present:
With own children under 18 years 0
No own children under 18 years 11
Female householder, no husband present:
With own children under 18 years 24
I
No own children under 18 years 14
Nonfamily households 135
FAMILY TYPE AND PRESENCE AND AGE OF CHILDREN
Universe: Families
II Married-couple family:
With children 18 years and over 729
No children 18 years and over 4712
Other family:
Male householder, no wife present:
With children 18 years and over 37
No children 18 years and over 97
Female householder, no husband present:
With children 18 years and over 234
No children 18 years and over 417
I
FAMILY TYPE AND AGE OF CHILDREN
Universe: Own children under I8 years
In married-couple family:
Under 3 years 463
3 and 4 years 212
II
5 years 93
6 to 11 years 851
12 and 13 years 221
14 years 137
II 15 to 17 years 395
In other family:
Male householder, no wife present:
Under 3 years 11
3 and 4 years 9
I
5 years 0
6 to 11 years 5
12 and 13 years 7
14 years 14
15 to 17 years 17
I Female householder, no husband present:
Under 3 years 48
3 and 4 years 31
5 years 7
6 to 11 years 95
II
12 and 13 years 60
14 years 19
15 to 17 years 74
II
II
II
II
II
i
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1
III. FAILURE OF LOCAL ASSUMPTION OF JURISDICTION
UNDER THE MOBILEHOME PARKS ACT AND NEED FOR RE-
' ESTABLISHMENT OF JURISDICTION BY THE STATE
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT: NON-COMPLIANCE WITH CODE FOR TWO
' STORY CABANAS OR IN EXCESS OF 14 FEET IN HEIGHT -
FAILURE TO ENFORCE UNOBSTRUCTED ACCESS TO
ROADWAY AND RELATED FIRE HAZARD, FAILURE TO
' ENFORCE CURRENT REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE LICENSING OF RECREATIONAL VEHICLES
In many respects, the City has failed in its task of properly enforcing the applicable
regulations specifying minimum health and safety requirements of the Health and Safety
' Code. These codes are generally contained in Title 25 of the California Code of
Administrative Regulations. The chronic failure to protect the health and general welfare of
the mobilehome tenant by enforcing code requires the State of California to resume its
jurisdiction over the park and correct the code violations which remain extant today. The
extent and variety of code violations is truly astonishing. It remains a mystery as to why the
' state has not stepped in long ago to cure the nonfeasance of the City.
Title 25 provides the authority for a capable local municipality to assume the
jurisdiction for enforcement of the Mobilehome Parks Act (Health and Safety Code section
182500, et seq.)
§ 1004. Local Enforcement. Assumption of responsibility for the enforcement of
Division 13, Part 2.1 of the California Health and Safety Code and the provisions of this
chapter relating to the enforcement of this chapter within mobilehome parks by a city, county,
' or city and county, shall be by means of an official ordinance, of the city council or board of
supervisors which shall contain the following information:
' Indication of assumption of responsibility for enforcement of the Health and Safety
Code, Division 13, Part 2.1, and the related administrative regulations.
Name of agency or agencies delegated enforcement responsibilities.
' A statement that the designated local enforcement agency will provide qualified
personnel necessary to enforce the provisions of this chapter consistent with the state
enforcement program. The statement shall include total number of personnel assigned to
' enforcement program.
Adoption of the applicable schedule of fees contained in the provisions of the Health
and Safety Code, Division 13, Part 2.1, and related administrative regulations.
' A statement adopting the state program and objectives as contained in Health and
Safety Code, Division 13, Part 2.1, and related administrative regulations.
A description of existing mobilehome parks in the jurisdiction, including conditions
' and occupancy status.
IT00100 052499 SEAL BEACH TRAILER PARK AGENDA Page 12
I
ISpecific local objectives,program plan and time table designed to achieve enforcement
compliance.
I Effective date of assumption of enforcement.
Two certified copies of the ordinance shall be forzvarded to the Administrative Office
of the Division of Codes and Standards not less than 30 days before the designated effective
Idate of assumption of enforcement.
In addition to providing the above information, the local enforcement agency shall
demonstrate actual inspection capability in making a mobilehome installation inspection to the
Isatisfaction of the department.
A statement that the forms used for application for permit to operate, the permit to
I operate, and the statement of installation acceptance shall be those provided by the state.
The enforcement agency shall send a copy of all permits to operate issued to the
Administrative Office of the Division of Codes and Standards. The copies of the permits to
I operate issued shall befoiwarded to the Administrative Office not later than the 15th of the
month following issuance of the permit to operate.
I The authority cited for this section is sections 18300 and 18613, Health and Safety
Code. It is expected that the municipality shall enforce these codes with at least the same
vitality as the state would under the circumstances. If not,an action will lie to require the state
Ito resume jurisdiction. Moreover, ordinary mandamus will lie to compel the city to enforce
the code. In several respects,the City has failed to enforce the code. The examples are many,
Iand a few of the prominent health and safety violations are noted here.
For example, there are several trailers which are land-locked and not adjacent to a
I driveway or roadway. The purpose for this obvious requirement is to permit immediate
access by fire department personnel and other emergency services. Since a trailer may burn
in three minutes or less, the bases for this state requirement for contiguity are manifest. A
Iroadway is defined as "an open way to provide access from a home lot within a mobilehome
park to a public thoroughfare."
I § 1106. Roadways.
Except as provided herein, each mobilehome shall have accessfrom the mobilehome lot to an
I abutting roadway of not less than 25 feet in clear width. All roadways shall have clear and
unobstructed access to a public thoroughfare, except that a roadway may have security gates
if such security gates are not in violation of local requirements.
IIn mobilehome parks, or portions thereof; constructed prior to September 15, 1961, each
mobilehome shall have accessfrom the mobilehome lot to a roadway not less than 15 feet in
I width.
In mobilehome parks which were constructed after September 23, 1974, and which contain
I not more than three mobilehome lots, each mobilehome shall have accessfrom the mobilehome
lot to a roadway not less than 20 feet in width.
I
IA It EN1'LON.SF.ALNCH.0111.052499 SEAL BEACH TRAILER PARK AGENDA Page 13
I
I
§1618. Access to Driveway (Roadway).
I
Except as provided herein, each mobilehome shall be maintained to provide accessfrom the
mobilehome lot to an abutting roadway of not less than 25 feet in clear width. All roadways
shall have clear and unobstructed access to a public thoroughfare, except that a roadway may
I
have security gates if such security gates are not in violation of local requirements.
In mobilehome parks, or portions thereof; constructed prior to September 15, 1961, each
Imobilehome shall have accessfrom the mobilehome lot to a roadway not less than 15 feet in
width.
IIn mobilehome parks which were constructed after September 23, 1974, and which contain
not more than three mobilehome lots, each mobilehome shall have accessfrom the mobilehome
I
lot to a roadway not less than 20 feet in width.
The mobilehomes and recreational vehicles must have access to a roadway abutting
I
the space on which the housing unit is cited. Many units do not have this access. The City is
required to revoke the statements of installation acceptance (formerly known as occupancy
permits) and require these units to vacate.
I Manyof the units have construction which is two stories in height. Such construction
g
Iis defined as a cabana. This construction is expressly prohibited by the Code.
§ 1002. Definitions.
I
For purposes of administration and enforcement the definitions contained in Sections
18200-18700 of the Health and Safety Code and those contained in this section shall apply
to this subchapter. The d f nitions relating to building standards contained in Parts 2, 3, 4
land 5 of Title 24, California Administrative Code are also applicable to the requirements of
this subchapter.
I
f. Cabana. A portable, demountable, or permanent room enclosure or other building erected
or constructed for human occupancy.
IA cabana is permitted under § 1444 ("A cabana may be erected, constructed, occupied or
maintained on a mobilehome lot only as an accessory structure to a mobilehome or travel trailer located on the
' same lot"). However, the height of the cabana is strictly limited as follows:
§1448. Cabana--Dimensions.
I
The height of a cabana shall not exceed one story in height or 14 feet at the highest point
above the actual adjoining ground level.
I
There are many cabanas constructed above this level.While the code allows flexibility
for new technologies in certain respects,it is clear that such policy for innovation is no license
I
IARENTCON.SEALBCH.00I.052499 SEAL BEACH TRAILER PARK AGENDA Page 14
I
I
for wholesale disregard of explicit code requirements concerning dimensions, size, set-backs,
and physical configuration. Indeed, if such innovation policies were otherwise read, the
I exception would swallow the entire code, rendering it meaningless and subject to individual
interpretation in each unique instance.
IIn sum, the cabanas are in violation of the code and must be reduced to the express
requirements of Section 1448.
II am also informed that at least one of the trailers is substandard. Space 94 is a public
nuisance. It has windows which are boarded up, no sewage, and is not waterproof. These
I basic habitability violations require immediate cure. I am informed that the occupant uses
common area facilities to shower because of the lack of working utility fixtures in the trailer.
In this regard, the code is quite explicit as to the definition of a substandard home, which is
Ideemed to be a public nuisance.
§ 1706. Substandard Recreational Vehicle.
IGeneral. Any recreational vehicle where there exists any of the following listed
conditions to an extent that endangers life, limb, health, propery, safety, or welfare of the
I public or the occupants thereof shall be deemed and hereby declared to be a substandard
recreational vehicle.
Inadequate sanitation shall include but not be limited to thefollowing:
I Lack of adequate ventilation.
Dampness of habitable rooms.
Infestation of insects, vermin or rodents.
I General dilapidation or improper maintenance.
Structural hazards shall include but not be limited to thefollowing:
Defective or deteriorated flooring or floor supports.
IMembers of walls,partitions, or other vertical supports that split, lean, list, or buckle due to
defective material or deterioration.
I Members of ceiling, roofs, ceiling and roof supports or other horizontal members which sag
split, or buckle due to defective material or deterioration.
Nuisance shall include but not be limited to thefollowing:
I Public nuisance known at common law or in equip)jurisprudence.
Whatever is dangerous to human life or is detrimental to health.
Whatever renders air,food or drink unwholesome, or detrimental to the health of human
I beings.
Hazardous electrical wiring shall include but not be limited to thefollowing:
All electrical wiring except that which conformed with all applicable laws in eat at the time
I of installation and which has been maintained in good condition and is being used in a safe
manner.
Electrical conductors which are not protected by overcurrent protective devices designed to open
Ithe circuit when the current exceeds the ampaci y of the conductor.
Electrical conductors which do not have ampaciy at least equal to the rating of outlet devices
I
IARENTCON.SEALBCH.001.052499 SEAL BEACH TRAILER PARK AGENDA Page 15
I
I
or equipment supplied.
Electrical conductors which are not protectedfrom physical damage.
I Metallic boxes,fittings, or equipment in an electrical wiring system which are not grounded
to prevent shock
Hazardous plumbing shall include but not be limited to thefollowing:
IAll plumbing except that which conformed with all applicable laws in Oct at the time of
installation and which has been maintained in good condition and which is free of cross
I connections and siphonage between fixtures.
Lack ofeffective "P"traps providing a water seal for each plumbing fixture.
Lack offfective venting of plumbing drain piping.
I Broken, unsanitary or leaking plumbing, pipe or fixtures.
Any fixture,fitting device or connection installed in such a manner as to permit contamination
of the potable water supply.
I Hazardous mechanical equipment shall include but not be limited to thefollowing:
All mechanical equipment, including all hearing equipment and its vent, except that which
conformed with all applicable laws in ffect at the time of installation and which has been
I maintained in good and safe condition, and is being used in a safe manner.
Healing or fuel burning equipment, including its vent, without adequate clearance from
combustible material.
IUnsupported, loose, or leaking fuel supply piping.
Faulty Weather Protection, which shall include but not be limited to the following:
I Deteriorated or ineffective waterproofing of exterior walls, roof, or
floors, including broken windows or doors.
Any recreational vehicle or portion thereof; device, apparatus, equipment, or combustible
I material which is in such a condition as to cause a fire or explosion.
Any such recreational vehicle is a public nuisance.
I § 1708. Abatement.
Any mobilehome or recreational vehicle, or portion thereof; which has become substandard as
defined herein, is hereby declared to be a nuisance and may be abated as hereinafter provided.
II am informed that the City has consciously decided to forbear from enforcing the
code in this instance.
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Moreover, trailers, mobilehomes, and recreational vehicles are required to bear
I current registration. There are several cases in which there is no record and or registration.
I am informed the City has done nothing to require the residents of the community to comply
with this basic requirement of the code.
These examples merely scratch the surface of the code violations rampant within this
trailer park, and about which the City has done absolutely nothing except either encourage
Ithe perpetuation of the code violations or at very least acquiesced in them.
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IWhere a ministerial duty lies and the governmental officer fails to perform the
required task, mandamus will lie to require such performance. Code of Civil Procedure
I section 1085. However, continuing supervision of the city to ascertain whether and to what
extent its dereliction of duty can be cured is often problematical. Thus, the only certainty of
future code enforcement lies with the surrender of jurisdiction for code enforcement to the
IState of California. I believe that the pattern of neglect and knowing proliferation of code
violations can only be remedied by this approach.
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IV. FAILURE TO FILE ANNUAL REPORTS WITH CALIFORNIA
COASTAL COMMISSION
' The covenant requires that the City file periodic reports with the California Coastal
Commission. I am informed that the California Coastal Commission has failed to receive any
' such reports for a considerable time. It appears here, too, that the City has failed to comply
with the duties required of it.
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IV. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE 25 OF THE CODE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS BY TENANCY COVENANTS
I REQUIRING "COMPLIANCE WITH ALL LAWS..." BY
ELIMINATION OF NUISANCES, HEALTH AND SAFETY
DANGERS, AND CODE AND REGULATION VIOLATIONS
I anydetermination as to whether the Citywill alter its current
Rather than await
I course of action and properly require compliance with the code in the trailer park, the park
owner has remedies which require compliance by injunctive relief or termination of tenancy.
I Every contract requires performance in accordance with the law. The rules and
regulations of this community require that the tenant obey all laws and regulations, in
essence. Even without this language, the compliance with code would be necessarily implied.
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Thepright owner has the ri ht to require compliance with the rules or threaten to
terminate tenancy. Civil Code section 798.56 expressly permits termination of tenancy for
Iviolation of the rules and regulations.
I (d) Failure of the homeowner or resident to comply with a reasonable rule or regulation of the
park that is part of the rental agreement or any amendment thereto.
No act or omission of the homeowner or resident shall constitute a failure to comply with a
I reasonable rule or regulation unless and until the management has given the homeowner
written notice of the alleged rule or regulation violation and the homeowner or resident has
failed to adhere to the rule or regulation within seven days. However, if a homeowner has been
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given a written notice of an alleged violation of the same rule or regulation on three or more
occasions within a 12-month period after the homeowner or resident has violated that rule or
regulation, no written notice shall be required for a subsequent violation of the same rule or
Iregulation. Nothing in this subdivision shall relieve the management from its obligation to
demonstrate that a rule or regulation has in fact been violated.
IThe park owner may also seek injunctive relief against violation of the rules and
regulations:
I § 798.88. (a) In addition to any right under Article 6(commencing with Section 798.55)
to terminate the tenancy of a homeowner, any person in violation of a reasonable rule or
I regulation of a mobilehome park may be enjoinedfrom the violation as provided in this section.
(b) A petition for an order enjoining a continuing or recurring violation of any
reasonable rule or regulation of a mobilehome park may be filed by the management thereof
Iwith the superior court for the county in which the mobilehome park is located. At the time of
filing the petition, the petitioner may obtain a temporary restraining order in accordance with
subdivision (a) of Section 527 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A temporary order restraining
Ithe violation may be granted, with notice, upon the petitioner's affidavit showing to the
satisfaction of the court reasonable proof of a continuing or recurring violation of a rule or
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regulation of the mobilehome park by the named homeowner or resident and that great or
irreparable harm would result to the management or other homeowners or residents of the park
I from continuance or recurrence of the violation.
(c) A temporary restraining order granted pursuant to this subdivision shall be
personally served upon the respondent homeowner or resident with the petition for injunction
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and notice of hearing thereon. The restraining order shall remain in effect for a period not to
exceed 15 days, except as modified or sooner terminated by the court.
(d) Within 15 days of filing the petition fir an injunction, a hearing shall be held
Ithereon. If the court, by clear and convincing evidence,finds the existence of a continuing or
recurring violation of a reasonable rule or regulation of the mobilehome parr the court shall
I issue an injunction prohibiting the violation. The duration of the injunction shall not exceed
three years.
(e) However, not more than three months prior to the expiration of an injunction
I issued pursuant to this section, the management of the mobilehome park may petition under
this sectionfor a new injunction where there has been recurring or continuous violation of the
injunction or there is a threat offuture violation of the mobilehome park's rules upon
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termination of the injunction.
(9 Nothing shall preclude a party to an action under this section from appearing
through legal counsel or in propria persona.
I (g) The remedy provided by this section is nonexclusive and nothing in this section
shall be construed to preclude or limit any rights the management of a mobilehome park may
Ihave to terminate a tenancy.
The park owner must be prepared to move forward and vigorously seek to enforce the
I code compliance in the park. Based on the number of violations which the City has permitted
or encouraged in the park, it is likely that many residents will seek relief for damages and
other claims against the City. The park owner will support those claims and assist the
Iresidents to obtain that relief based on the misfeasance and nonfeasance of the City.
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VI. RELIEF FROM THE COVENANT BY THE MERGER OF
TITLE OF THE GROUND LESSOR AND THE LESSEE
IThe current owner purchased the fee simple absolute of the park. The covenant states,
expressly, that the fee owner is not bound by the restrictions posed by the covenant.
I itisclear that the acquisition of the fee bythe lessee
Under the doctrine of merger, q
I causing a merger of the lease and fee into a fee simple absolute legally dissolves the covenant.
Just why the fee owner was expressly not bound by the covenant is unimportant because the
plain meaning of the language is clear. A stipulation regarding such issues would have been
I honored if ever considered (which was not the case). For example, United States v Joe
Murray's Point Lookout (S.D.N.Y.1972) 342 F.Supp. 92, 94-96. Whatever the reason why
no provision was made in this case, the park owner, as owner of the fee simple absolute,now
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under color of law, has been subjected to conditions over which on their face to do not apply.
This constitutional violation is continuing and would subject the city to a claim for damages
under the federal civil rights statute (42 U.S.C. §1983). Whatever the reasons for not binding
Ithe fee owner, those reasons apply to the park owner as successor in interest. Both damages,
punitive damages and attorneys fees and costs are recovered from the city and any individual
I employees or agents who have taken any part in the enforcement of these invalid restrictions.
Like a police beating,every governmental officer who enforces the covenant against my client
is guilty for the injury which has been inflicted.
IThe covenant could have easily anticipated the merger doctrine: it is no arcane,
esoteric or commonly misunderstood legal doctrine. The covenant plainly states, rather, that
Ithe fee owner is not subject to the covenant. The fee owner was deemed to be free to do with
the property as it wished, including hypothecating it to the lessee. If this were not to be the
I result, where in the covenant is there such a restraint on alienation? Nor is there any
covenant restricting the lessee, specifically, from becoming the fee owner. Why wasn't the
lessee bound to follow the covenant if he were to become the fee owner? There is no
I provision because the City plainly took the risk, especially as the drafter of the covenant, that
such an occurrence would not take place.The covenant is therefore construed in favor of free
alienability, against the City, and in favor of free (versus restricted) use of the property.
IThe inescapable conclusion is that the a merger has taken place and this park owner
is not bound by the covenant.
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Merger results when agreater estate and a lesser estate in the same parcel of real
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I property are held by the same person. The lesser estate merges into the greater estate and is
extinguished. The doctrine of merger applies only when the entire title, both legal and
equitable,unite in the same person. Sheldon v La Brea Materials Co. (1932)216 C. 686, 689,
I 15 P.2d 1098; Carpenter v Pacific States Say. & Loan Co. (1937) 19 C.A.2d 263, 268-269,
64 P.2d 1102, 66 P.2d 656. Another example is the termination of an easement when the
same person acquires both the dominant and servient estates. In our case, merger applies
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because the estates of a lessor and lessee are held by the same person, the park owner.
IThus, when one person holds both the reversionary interest of the landlord and the
leasehold estate of the tenant,the leasehold may merge into the landlord's estate and the lease
terminates. Erving v Jas. H. Goodman & Co. Bank (1915) 171 C. 559, 563, 153 P. 945;
ISmiley et al. v Van Winkle et al. (1856)6 C. 605, 606; Gaskill v Trainer(1853) 3 C. 334, 340.
Thus, a conveyance of the fee title to the tenant results in a merger of the leasehold estate,
I which terminates the lease and relieves the tenant of his covenant to pay rent. Civil Code
§1933(3); Silveira v Ohm (1949) 33 C.2d 272, 276, 201 P.2d 387. This is precisely what
happened in this case. Clearly, the fee owner was not to be subject to the covenant. The fee
Iowner is the park owner and he is not bound thereby.
In Lloyd Corp. v Riddell(S.D.Cal. 1963) 222 F. Supp. 587, 591 (affirmed in part and
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reversed in part insofar as merger of interests for purposes of determining the depletion
allowance under the Internal Revenue Code is concerned), the Court said it precisely:
I "The early common law was unequivocal in stating that when a smaller estate and a larger
estate came into the same hands, assuming no estate intervened, there was a merger of the
I smaller estate into the larger. . . This same general view has been accepted and followed in
California."
I This very important proposition may or may not be accepted by the City. But due to
the importance of the rights at stake,and the investment made not just in a leasehold, but the
economic investment made in the entire property, the park owner is prepared to immediately
Iinstitute legal action to break the shackles of this onerous restriction under which he
wrongfully is required to operate and function. Certainly, the fee owner is entitled to be free
of the restraints imposed by the covenant. The covenant says so. The inability of the fee
Iowner to make unencumbered use of the property free of the covenant is a continuing taking
of his property, and is repugnant to the nature and spirit of the covenant itself.
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IVII. FAILURE TO PROVIDE FOR LOW AND MODERATE
INCOME HOUSING BY ALLOWING "SCALPING" OF LOW
I INCOME TENANCY RIGHTS (SELLING THE RIGHT OF
TENANCY AT FAIR MARKET VALUE); RELIEF FROM THE
COVENANT BY REASON OF CHANGED CONDITIONS
One of the reasons for resistance to amending the covenant, even were it found to be
' enforceable against the fee owner, is that benefits for other properties were earned by the
former lessee. This proffered justification would be tantamount to admitting that a
confiscatory effect is imposed on the trailer park parcel, but that it is warranted by other
Iconsideration goes the argument.
This proposition is not supportable in the first instance as discussed below. The
I covenant is no longer enforceable because of the changed conditions occasioned by the
current ownership structure of the parcel, the profiteering or "scalping" of low income
tenancy rights by the tenants having the effect of defeating the maintenance of low and
Imoderate income housing, and the inability of the rent structure to keep pace with rent
standards for low and moderate income housing. Even under low income rent standards, a
I monthly rent of$515.00 per month would be permissible. The covenant no longer serves any
of its original purposes because of changed conditions rendering it of no rational purpose
whatsoever.
IThe legal doctrine of "changed conditions" is straightforward and indisputable.
Notwithstanding the agreement between the parties specifying an intended duration of a
Irestriction, they become unenforceable when the character of the restricted property has
changed to such an extent that the original purpose for the restrictions has become obsolete.
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The original purpose of the restrictions is rendered obsolete if continued enforcement of the
restrictions would be of no substantial benefit to intended recipients of the benefit.
I The doctrine of changed conditions operates to prevent the perpetuation of
inequitable and oppressive restrictions on land use and development that would merely
harass or injure one party without benefiting the other. This is the case here. Because trailer
I are being sold for many, many multiples of their true value, the incoming purchaser pays a
heavy premium. That premium is the equivalent of key money. The existence of this
phenomenon has been so well understood that even a law review article has addressed it.
I Thishenomena is so irrational as to constitute a regulatory taking. In our situation,
P '� rY n g
I it constitutes absolute proof that the covenant is irrational to its intended purpose and
deprives the fee owner of its rights in its property as guaranteed by the covenant and due
process of law.
IOn April 1, 1992,the United States Supreme Court handed down Yee vs. Escondido.
Much has been written about the Yee decision, and much of the anticipation regarding
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1 whether vacancy controls constitute a regulatory taking when applied in a trailer park was
focused on the emergence of a future controversy to test the constitutionality of such a
I regulation. That anticipation is now at an end. In Richardson v. City and County of
Honolulu (1997) 124 F.3d 1150, the Court has determined that vacancy controls constitute
unconstitutional taking of property under the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Ian
Constitution. The controls applicable to the Hawaii property owners are in all material legal
respects identical to the operative and salient provisions of the covenant. The facts
I demonstrate that vacancy controls imposed against trailer park owners represent an
unconstitutional restriction in violation of the federal rights of the property owner. A close
study of Richardson leaves this conclusion inescapable. In the Richardson case, large private
I landowners adopted a pattern of leasing their land for long terms rather than selling it. Such
is the required circumstance of the trailer park.
IIn Richardson, the land was often leased to a developer who built condominiums on
the property. The condominiums are then sold subject to the ground lease. Unlike the
I condominiums, trailer park tenants enjoy greater freedom, because all the "improvements"
(the trailer) can be removed. Permanently constructed buildings are annexed into the real
property and cannot be removed absent some form of consensual deviation from this
I normative standard (in this sense, the site built cabanas in the trailer park are the property
of the park owner). Sometimes the landowners themselves built and sold the condominiums,
subject to a ground lease. The leases, commonly for 55 years or longer, require a substantial
I initial payment and lease payments for 25 to 30 years at a fixed rate. At the end of the initial
term,the rent would be renegotiated pursuant to the terms of the lease. The new rent usually
was based on the market value of the unimproved land as described in the lease: the
Irenegotiated rent was fixed at a percentage of the market value of the parcel underneath the
condominium exclusive of improvements (i.e., the condominium). In almost all cases, the
I renegotiated rent substantially exceeded the initial fixed rate. This example of the market
readjustments was portrayed by the Court:
I The lessees of one apartment purchased their unit in january of 1988 for$986,500, and
assumed the existing ground lease. They currently pay $45 per month in ground lease rent
and will continue to do so until the 30 year fixed rent period expires in 1997. At that time,
I the lease fixes the new rent at six percent of the fair market value of the land exclusive of
improvements. If the period had ended in 1991, the parties to the lease might have used the
real property tax assessed value used by the City as the fair market value of the land exclusive
Iof improvements. In 1991 the real property tax assessed value used by the City for the land
appurtenant to the unit was $213,300. The new ground lease rent would be 6% of that
figure, which is $12,798 per year, or$1,066 per month.
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To break up this pattern of land ownership and control the escalating prices of
I housing,the City passed Ordinances 91-95 and 91-96 on December 18, 1991. The rapid rise
in Hawaiian land prices often resulted in renegotiated rent several hundred times greater than
the initial fixed rent. The city sought to stop the exercise of these property rights. For our
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Ipurposes, the covenant is an iteration of a vacancy control regulation in Seal Beach. Its
operation is essentially that of a rent control law identical thereto. The Honolulu Ordinance
Iaccomplishes its goal in two ways.
First, the Ordinance, which applies to all leases that contain provisions for
Irenegotiation of lease rents for owner-occupied condominiums,limits the number and
regulates the timing of renegotiations. The Ordinance provides that the first
I renegotiation shall not occur within fifteen years of the initial date of the lease, while
subsequent renegotiations shall occur no sooner than every ten years.
I Second, the Ordinance caps rents by linking the maximum renegotiated rent to the
consumer price index. The Ordinance limits the renegotiated rent to the initial rent
multiplied by a rent factor. The initial rent is the greater of the rent specified by the
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lease and the reasonable rental value on the effective date of the lease. The rent factor
is the average consumer price index for the six-month period in which the rent
renegotiation occurs, divided by the average consumer price index on the date of the
Iinitial lease.
I Moreover,the lessee was free to transfer the leasehold without rent increases,virtually
identical to the covenant which also restricts rent increases on transfer of a trailer. The
Ordinance contemplated the conveyance of condominiums subject to renegotiated leases on
I the underlying land. The Ordinance provided that, if an owner-occupant of a condominium
conveys or transfers the leasehold interest in the underlying land during a renegotiated rent
period to a person who intends to occupy the condominium apartment,the renegotiated land
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rent shall apply to the transferee tenant. In other words, the owner-occupant of a
condominium was free to convey his or her leasehold interest in the underlying land to a
person intending to occupy the condominium and the transferee will receive the benefit of
Ithe renegotiated land lease. However,if the condominium is conveyed to someone who is not
an owner-occupant, the lessor of the underlying land may reopen the negotiation.
IThe property owners contended that the Ordinance's conveyance provisions create
a premium,which an owner-occupant can capture when she sells a condominium subject to
I a renegotiated land rent. If the transferee intends to occupy the condominium, he receives
the benefit of the renegotiated rent. Hence, the transferor will charge a premium reflecting
the net present value of the difference between the renegotiated land rent and the free market
Iland rent. The conveyance provision vitiates the cause-and-effect relationship between the
property use restricted (rent rates) and the social evil the Ordinance seeks to remedy (lack of
I affordable housing). The property owners argued that the Ordinance violated the Takings
Clause of the United States Constitution in two ways. First, the property owners contended
that the Ordinance failed to substantially further its stated public purposes and, therefore,
I constitutes a regulatory taking because the Ordinance allows a lessee to monetize a
below-market renegotiated rent at the expense of the lessor. This is the essence of a vacancy
control mechanism like the covenant,which does not even permit an increase within low and
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Imoderate income guidelines. Second, the property owners asserted that the Ordinance
violated the Fifth Amendment because it fails to provide for consideration of individualized
Ifactors that might affect the value of the lease at the time of renegotiation.
The City argued that individualized consideration is not necessary and the alleged
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ground lease premium does not render the Ordinance unconstitutional. The Court found the
Honolulu regulations to constitute a taking. The trial court had found that the Ordinance
I allowed a lessee to capture the present value of the below market land rent. 802 F.Supp. at
338. The appeals Court agreed for different reasons.
' The Ordinance's failure to regulate resales, according to the district court, effected a transfer
ofwealthfrom lessors to lessees... Because of this transfer of wealth, which generally does not
occur in the ordinary rent control ordinance, the court held that the Ordinance is
I unconstitutional. While we agree that the Ordinance effects a regulatory taking and, therefore
is unconstitutional, we do so for somewhat different reasons than the district court.
Rather, the Court held that the transfer of the leasehold without a market rate
adjustment did not advance a legitimate state interest, such as dealing with housing issues.
It merely allowed residents to profit on undermarket leases.
Land use regulations do influence the value of properp, but to be constitutional, they must do
I so in a manner that substantially fathers a legitimate government interest.Naito; 483 U S.
at 834, 107 S Ct. at 3147. Ordinance 91-96 does not do this. It regulates the use of the
lessors'property interests in a manner that does not substantially further the goal of creating
I affordable housing. The absence of a mechanism that prevents lessees
from capturing the net present value of the reduced land rent in the
form of a premium, means that the Ordinance will not
II substantially further its goal of creating affordable owner-occupied
housing in Honolulu. Incumbent owner occupants who sell to those
who intend to occupy the apartment will charge a premium for the
Ibenefit of living in a rent controlled condominium. The price of
housing ultimately will remain the same. The Ordinance thus
I effects a regulatory taking.
Irl., at 1165-1166.
I The Court also held that no record was necessary to establish the facial regulatory
taking. The allegations, in a summary judgment motion, were sufficient.
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"There are two independent prudential hurdles to a regulatory taking claim brought ... in
federal court." Suitum v. Tahoe Ronal Planning Agency, --- US. ----, ----, 117 S.Ct.
1659, 1664, 137 L.Ed.2d 980 (1997). The first hurdle, that the plaintiff obtain a final
decision regarding the application of the regulation to the property at issue from the entity
charged with implementing the regulation, id at----, 117 S Ct. at 1665, does not apply to
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Ifacial regulatory takings claims. Levald, 998 F.2d at 686. Twice before we have
characterized premium based challenges to a rent control statute as facial challenges. See
I Carson Harbor, 37 F.3d at 474 n. 5 ("In Levald, which involved similar facts, we noted
that the premium is 'relevant only to a facial, not an as-applied, regulatory challenge.' ').
The first hurdle thus does not apply to the Bishop Estate's argument. "The second hurdle
Istems from the Fifth Amendment's proviso that only takings without gust compensation'
infringe that Amendment; 'if a State provides adequate procedure fir seeking just
compensation, the property owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation clause
Iuntil it has used the procedure and been denied just compensation.' " Suitum, --- U.S at
----, 117 S.Ct. at 1665 (quoting Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 195, 105 S.Ct. at
I 3121 (1985)). Because the Bishop Estate's argument that the Ordinance does not
substantially further a legitimate state interest does not depend upon the extent to which the
Estate is compensated, its facial regulatory taking claim is ripe.
IId at 1165.
Richardson is directly apposite to the covenant and reflects that such regulation is
I unconstitutional for the same reasons as the Honolulu ordinance. Certiorari has been denied
by the Supreme Court, rendering the Richardson decision binding in the Ninth Circuit.
IThe future right of a market return from the park owner's property based on
prospective occupation of a particular space after the departure of a tenant who voluntarily
I terminates his tenancy by sale or vacation from the property, is a property right which
belongs to the park owner. If a tenant voluntarily terminates tenancy, he has no further right
to live in the park. He may sell the used trailer but certainly has no right to sell the rent-
Icontrolled tenancy at current fair market value.
Thus,the future right of occupation, after a tenant leaves the park,belongs to the park
Iowner. The mobilehome may be sold for continued occupation on the property, but the park
owner has the right to set the rent. The park owner has a right to protect a just return upon
his property, and this right of future possession cannot be siphoned from the community by
Ithe vacating tenant in the form of"scalping a ticket"just to open the door to the valuable
right to live under rent control.
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Plainly, vacancy decontrol has nothing to do with protecting existing residents from
excessive rent increases. The covenant has nothing at all to do with protecting against
I excessive rent increases against existing residents or protecting affordable housing for tenants.
The covenant has nothing to do with protecting against excessive rents against new
purchasers either: the new purchaser must pay the cost of future rent control in the form of
Ian excessive price for the trailer itself. Instead of increased monthly rents, the purchaser pays
one high price financed with a mortgage - the equivalent of higher rents, but with interest.
IIt is equally clear that the "regulatory taking" occurs by reason of the textual mandate
of the covenant. Allowing the vacating tenant--who will sell the coach,vacate and disappear
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"into the sunset" with money for the market value of the rental pad paid by the tenant--is
contrary to the very essence of rent control--and constitutes a transfer of wealth outside the
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"shield" rent control raises against exorbitant rents to existing tenants.
This result was forecasted by the Yee, decision itself. There the court recites the
Irelationship of such a rent control law with the effect of the California Mobilehome
Residency Law:
IBecause under the California Mobilehome Residency Law the park owner cannot evict a
mobile home owner or easily confer the property to other uses, the argument goes, the mobile
I home owner is effectively a perpetual tenant of the park, and the increase in the mobile home's
value thus represents the right to occupy a pad at below-market rent indefinitely. And because
the Mobilehome Residency Law permits the mobile home owner to sell the mobile home in
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place, the mobile home owner can receive a premiumfrom the purchaser corresponding to this
increase in value. The amount of this premium is not limited by the Mobilehome Residency
Law or the Escondido ordinance. As a result,petitioners conclude, the rent control ordinance
Ihas transferred a discrete interest in land--the right to occupy the land indefinitely at a sub-
market rent--from the park owner to the mobile home owner. Petitioners contend that what has
I been transferredfrom park owner to mobile home owner is no less than a right of physical
occupation of the park owner's land.
I Then, the court states that such a pleading would constitute a valid claim comporting
with the requirements for proving a "regulatory" taking.
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"This argument, while perhaps within the scope of our regulatory taking cases, . . . "
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Indeed, the court even recognizes that "key money" is prohibited under general rent
Icontrols.
I 'Most apartment tenants do not sell anything to their successors (and are often prohibited from
charging "key money ) so a typical rent control statute will transfer wealthfrom the landlord
to the incumbent tenant and allfuture tenants."
I And sellingtrailers with added value for the right to access to the pad is the same as
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"scalping a ticket." It completely defeats the objective of providing low income housing and
I discriminates against anyone without the wealth to afford access to the housing. It is not
allowed under rent control because it recognizes the obvious: whoever can extract the "key
money" can capitalize on the park owners' property rights.
I "This .effect might have some bearing on whether the ordinance causes a re�lato taking as
it may shed some light on whether there is a sufficient nexus between the effect of the ordinance
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and the objectives it is suppose to advance."
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The court further states that a regulatory taking argument could be posed by reason
of the state law which has the effect of depriving the park owner of the ability to choose the
I incoming tenant. The court repeats its invitation that the park owners challenge such an
effect.
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"Again, this Oct may be relevant to a regulatory taking argument, as it may be one factor a
reviewing court would wish to consider in determining whether the ordinance unjustly imposes
a burden upon petitioners that should 'be compensated by the government rather than
Iremain[ngJ disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.'(citation omitted)"
I Thus,Yee stands for the proposition that a regulatory taking theory and a claim that
vacancy controls constitute a substantive due process violation would be embraced by the
high court in a subsequent appeal. Richardson is the realization of this eventuality. Indeed,
I there are no indications from the court to the contrary -- that a "regulatory" taking claim
should not be pursued.
IThe underlying issue addressed by the Supreme Court itself is whether or not vacancy
control constitutes a taking under the analysis of the court reached in Nollan vs. California
I Coastal Commission. In that case, Nollan, a property owner, sought to rehabilitate a beach-
front bungalow, and was met by resistance from the Coastal Commission. The Coastal
Commission demanded that he provide a public easement to the beach. Nollan refused. He
I sued and alleged there was no connection between his plan, and any impact on a public
interest which warranted the extortionate demand for an easement. The high court agreed.
Such an action was deemed to be a regulatory taking by the Supreme Court.
IThe Court held that this impingement upon Nollan's property interest constituted an
impermissible regulation which was tied to no rational public interest or legitimate objective
Ithe state was free to pursue.
I Certainly such an easement would allow the public access to the beach,would provide
the public with a means to enjoy a view of the beach and only minimally affect the use of
Nollan's property. It in no way affected the change in the bungalow he desired to rehabilitate.
I Yet, the court quite easily determined that the public easement could not be extracted
without payment of compensation, and that the easement requirement was unrelated to the
use of the property that Nollan desired to make (rehabilitating his house).
IRent controls may only exist to stop excessive rents to existing tenants, and protect a
just return. Rent controls may not generate "key money" or "pad access" money. Such an
Ieffect has no rational nexus under the Nollan standard, therefore. The covenant also
therefore effects a continuing taking of my clients' property. Since there is no legitimate
I relationship between pad access money and protecting the existing tenants from excessive
rents, it is clear that the vacancy control scheme is completely irrational and will fail under
the Nollan analysis as applied in Richardson. This is also true here because under the
I
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Icovenant, there is no rational basis for charging a rent well less than low and moderate
income rent levels while allowing existing tenants to command the ability to market that right
I
at market value. The covenant institutionalizes "scalping" of tenancy rights.
It is fairly easy to estimate the amount of damage inflicted upon the passage of vacancy
Icontrol. Any reasonable indicator or expert opinion can be adduced to show the value of a
used trailer sitting upon a dealer's lot. Then, such a trailer can be compared to what it could
I be sold for situated within a trailer park subject to rent control with vacancy control. In many
instances, the disparity is significant.
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VIII. RELIEF FROM THE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
CONFISCATORY EFFECTS OF SEVERABLE PARCEL OF LAND
I USED AS A TRAILER PARK, AS A SEPARATE "LINE" OR
ENTERPRISE OF THE OWNER.
IThe economic return on the park is so low as to be confiscatory. The rent levels,
intended to serve the interests of low and moderate income, have become, with passage of
I time, far less than the low and moderate income thresholds under law(currently at $515 per
month). Moreover, analysis of the fee owner's interest in the use of the land, originally
expressly prescribed to be free of the covenants, is interpreted by the City as still now
I controlled by the covenants. In essence, there is no fair return for the fee owner, and the
covenant was never intended to apply to the fee owner. Even assuming arguendo that the
lessee's interest were no susceptible to challenge (certainly not the case), the component of
Iproperty interest held by the fee owner is restricted. There is no consideration for the interest
of the fee owner, and the covenant expressly excludes such interest from regulation. The fee
I owner's interests in the land are bound without any rough proportionality to the burden
imposed by the fee owner's use; the fee owner is barred, by the City lights, from seeking any
individualized relief from the draconian restrictions on economic return by wrongful
I subjection to the restrictions of the covenant. This continuing condition constitutes a
confiscatory effect on the fee owner.
I Simply, the City may argue that a trade-off existed, consisting of a fixed rent burden
for the trailer park, against the countervailing benefit of approval for a subdivision consisting
of town homes or condominiums. The current owner owns the fee which is not so restricted
Iand also operates the park. The result, many years later is unconscionable. The effect of the
City interpretation is that the expressly unrestricted fee is bound to the covenant. This
I contravenes the terms of the covenant, and deprives the fee owner of one of the valuable
"sticks" in the bundle of property rights vested in each property owner. In sum, the City
interpretation of the covenant constitutes a taking at least as to the fee ownership, and in fact
as to the owner qua park operator.
There is an absolute cap on rents for low and moderate income residents. That cap
I does not reflect current low and moderate income levels. If that be the intent the covenant
is subject to the remedy of reformation or annulment because no covenant can be enforced
where to do so imposes an unconstitutional result. On the face and as applied, the covenant
Idoes not accomplish the underlying intent it is targeted for. The plain evidence of the
irrationality and subversion of the intentions consists of the premium leases transferred at fair
I market value by the residents. The formulation provides no means for adjustment of
changed conditions so the intent of the covenant can continue to be sustained. Even were
there such a formula, the constitutional standard must permit a fair return. Under the
I covenant, there is no formula to even consider. Such a formula cannot be confiscatory
(Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, supra, 48 Ca1.3d at pp. 816-821) and it cannot impose an
absolute limit on rental increases (id. at p. 817; City of Miami Beach v. Forte Towers, Inc.
IARENTCON.SEALBCH.00i.oszass SEAL BEACH TRAILER PARK AGENDA Page 31
1
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(Fla. 1974) 305 So.2d 764; Cromwell Assocs. v. Newark, supra, 511 A.2d at p. 1275 [any
absolute limit, "even a generous 25%," is arbitrary in that it may not insure a fair return in
I
all circumstances].)Local rent restrictions must permit a park owner to receive a just and fair
return on property.' This fundamental right was echoed in Fisher v. City of Berkeley, citing
Cotati Alliance for Better Housing v. City of Cotati, 148 Cal.App.3d at p. 295; Hutton Park
IGardens v. Town Council (1975) 68 NJ. 543, 350 A.2d 1, 15 "[a just and reasonable return
on investment is one that is generally commensurate with returns on investments in other
I enterprises having comparable risks]." Hutton Park Gardens, a progenitor of California rent
regulation jurisprudence, was decided with Troy Hills Village v. Township Council (1975)
68 NJ. 604,referring to Troy Hills regarding the standards to be developed for implementing
I a just and fair constitutional requirements ["We further call attention to what we have said
in Troy Hills... as to the formulation of standards and criteria of fair return in a rent-
controlled context..."]. Id. at 68 NJ. 543, 572.
' However, the dedicated use for low and moderate income, does more than control
rents; it converts the park into a public utility by requiring a use at fixed cost to accomplish
Ia public purpose. That purpose as originally conceived has now been totally frustrated and
is of no consequence due to the sale of trailers and undermarket leases traded at fair market
I values as stated above. Here, there has been an undeclared taking,when in fact as a public
utility, it was intended that at least low and moderate rent levels would be permitted. Even
section 8 housing relief provides for adjustments and fair rents. For a housing utility the rate
I of return, as in other utilities, is to be at fair market value of the enterprise. What originally
existed no longer resembles the purpose, because the recipients have thwarted the intent.
That intent can only be restored by permitting current low and moderate rent thresholds and
Ia declaration of further assurance that the fee owner is not bound by the covenant.
I By stark contrast, of course, overly restrictive rent ordinances will be struck down
where it may merely appear that confiscation may result. Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley(1976)
17 Cal.3d 129 [130 Cal. Rptr. 465, 550 P.2d 1001]. And in the famous CalFarm case, the
I Supreme Court held the insolvency provision of Proposition 103 unconstitutional on its face.
The insurer was required to prove that without a rate increase,the insurer would be rendered
insolvent. No definition of"insolvency" could conform to the constitutional standard of a fair
I and reasonable return. Id. at 818-19 [258 Cal.Rptr. at 167-68, 771 P.2d at 1253-54]. The
Calfarm Court reasoned that the "insolvency" provision prevented solvent insurers from
obtaining relief from "inadequate" rates. a at 819 [258 Cal.Rptr. at 168, 771 P.2d at 1254].
IHere, relief is also proper.
I I Westwinds MobileHome Park v. Mobilh m Park Rental Review Bd. (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 84
[35
I Cal.Rptr. 315],at 91: "Owner and City do not seriously dispute that price controls on rent are within the police
power if they are reasonably calculated both to eliminate excessive rents and to provide the owner with a"just and
reasonable" return on its property. (See, e.g.,Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian(1989)48 Ca1.3d 805, 816 [258
Cal.Rptr. 161,771 P.2d 1247]."
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IIX. CLOSURE TO AVOID UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
CONFISCATORY EFFECT OF COVENANT RENDERING THE
I CURRENT USE OF TRAILER PARK AS NOT ECONOMICALLY
VIABLE.
IUltimately, the recourse for the park owner is to close the park and change use to a
more economic enterprise.This option was guaranteed by the Yee v. Escondido case in 1992.
IUnder California law, assistance to the tenant in the form of payment for relocation
of the residents may not exceed the "reasonable costs of relocation." This means that the
I park owner cannot be required to pay for the sited value of the trailer. The cost of relocating
to another park is all that may be granted. Several cases have addressed these requirements.
IIt is important to note that the housing element of the general plan calls for housing
of the sort offered by the trailer park. The general plan will be deficient if this housing were
be eliminated. For the reasons set forth above (under the Nollan and Dollan analysis),
Ito
future use could not be burdened with such a requirement without the payment of significant
just compensation if it could be established, arguendo, that such constituted a public use.
IDonald Rooke, et al., v. City of Scotts Valley
C.A.6th,July 13, 1990 (unpublished)
I In Donald Rooke, et al., v. Cityof Scotts Valley, C.A.6th, July13, 1990
r
(unpublished),the Court struck down a re-purchase requirement imposed on the park owner.
IThis important case is a precursor of the authorities we may reasonably expect to follow.
I Donald and Marjorie Rooke challenged Scotts Valley conversion ordinance. It
provided that a mobilehome park could not be converted to any other use, including a
reversion to bare land, without approval by the City planning commission. The ordinance
I further provided that if a conversion were approved, certain conditions must attach. If the
mobilehome could not be moved, or if the resident refused to accept relocation, the park
owner was required to purchase the mobilehome at its in-place fair market
ivalue.
On November 19, 1986, the Rookes filed their complaint against the City. Their first
Icause of action stated a claim for damages for inverse condemnation. They alleged that the
City's rent control and conversion ordinances together effected a transfer of a possessory
I interest in the property to the residents and amounted to a taking of property without just
compensation in violation of the United States and California Constitutions. In their second
cause of action the Rookes sought damages for violations of their civil rights under 42 U.S.C.
l
§1983. And lastly, they sought a judicial declaration that the City's ordinances were
unconstitutional, both facially and as-applied.
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The Rookes sought compensation representing the full value of their property
($1,500,000), or in the alternative for "interim takings as shown according to proof." In
addition they sought damages for lost business opportunities, mental anguish, carrying costs
of the property, litigation expenses, and punitive damages. The case went to trial on the
declaratory relief cause of action and the parties stipulated that the only issue to be
determined by the court was whether the conversion ordinance was unconstitutional on its
' face. In holding that the Ordinance violated the Plaintiffs' constitutional rights, The Fifth
Amendment was cited:
' The protection of private property rights is guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution: 'No person shall be. . . deprived of due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation. Article I, section 19 of the
California Constitution similarly provides that compensation is required when property is
"taken or damaged."
The Court also held that". . . a taking occurs when the government physically intrudes
upon private property, either directly or by authorizing others to do so. (See, e.g., Loretto v.
TelePrompter Manhattan CATV Corp. (1982) 458 U.S. 419; Kaiser Aetna v. United States
' (1979) 444 U.S. 164; United States v. Causby (1946) 328 U.S. 256) But courts have long
recognized another type of taking,which may occur when land use regulation "goes too far."
(Penna. Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra, 260 U.S. at p. 415)
. . .it[the regulation]goes too far if it "denies an owner economically viable use of his land."
' (Agins v. Tiburon, supra, 447 US at p. 260.)
In addition to economic impact, the character of the governmental interference and
' the nature of the particular property right affected must be considered in the takings analysis.
' A regulation which "extinguish[es]afundamental attribute ofoumership"may also constitute
a taking of propery. (Agins v. Tiburon, supra, 447 US. at p. 262.) While the rights "to
possess, use and dispose"of proper0 are considered to be the three essential strands in the
bundle of rights which is commonly characterized as property (US. v. General Motors Corp.
' (1945) 323 US. 373, 377-378), other rights, such as the right to devise, are also
fundamental to property ownership. Thus a unanimous Supreme Court in Hodel v. Irving
' (1987) 107 S.Ct. 2076 recently found a compensable taking even though only that one
component of the bundle of rights was affected and even though the economic impact of the
regulation was slight.
' Additional) the Court held that the regulation must substantiallyadvance the
Y� �
legitimate government interest. A buy-out could not be found to do so.
A regulation may also be a taking if it fails to "substantially advance legitimate state
'ARENTCON.SF.ALBCH.00L052499 SEAL BEACH TRAILER PARK AGENDA Page 34
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Iinterests."(Agins v. Tiburon, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 260.) Recently in.Nollan v. California
Coastal Com'n (1987) 107 S Ct. 3141, the Supreme Court announced a new emphasis on
I
heightened judicial scrutiny of land-use regulations challenged under the Takings Clause.
There the majori y held there must be a direct "nexus" between the restrictive condition
imposed on the landowner and the public purpose behind the regulatory scheme.
I It isparamount to note the significance of the fifth amendment in this context. In
gn conte t
I essence the Takings Clause provides a check on the government's exercise of the police power
for the public interest. The ultimate question in considering whether a regulation has gone
too far is whether it "forges] some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness
I and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." (Armstrong v. United States (1960)
364 U.S. 40, 49.)
I It is well known that there is generally a considerable discrepancy between the bluebook value
of a mobilehome and its in-place value when installed in a park The derence is
attributable to the location of the mobilehome in the park and the effects of rent control. The
Iimpact of section 17.1.9.060(C) is that the landowner who changes
the use of his property becomes obligated to pay his tenants, solely
I at their option, an amount equal to the value of their personal
property plus the lease value of the underlying land.
I
In conclusion, the Court held:
Together these provisions effect an enforced dedication of the land
I to perpetual use as a mobilehome park and clearly abrogate the
landowner's basic rights to use and possess the property. We see
little difference between the effect here and in those cases where
Iproperty owners are required to subject their property to public use.
(Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., supra, 458 U.S. 419 [installation of
I
a television cable]; Kaiser Aetna v. United States, supra, 444 US. 174/imposition of a
navigational servitude]; ,Nollan v. California Coastal Com'n, supra, 107 S Ct. 3141
[dedication of a public right of way].)
IThe Court also found the conversion ordinance unconstitutional on the Nollan basis
because it failed to substantially advance a governmentally legitimate purpose.
IEven apart from the economic impact of a regulation, a taking may be found if a
restriction on land use does not "substantially advance legitimate state interests." (Agins v.
ITiburon, supra, 447 US. at p. 262.) "Where the conditions imposed are not related to the
use being made of the propery but are imposed because the entiy conceives a means ofshifting
the burden of providing the cost of a public benefit to another not responsible for or only
remotely or speculatively benefiting from it, there is an unreasonable exercise of the police
power."(Liberty v. California Coastal Com. (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 491, 502.)
I
IARENTCON.SEALBCH.001.052499 SEAL BEACH TRAILER PARK AGENDA Page 35
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IThe Nollan Doctrine
The Rooke Court also held the regulation would violate the Nollan doctrine:
I
When examined in the light of the,Nollan decision, section 17.49.060(C) of the conversion
I ordinance does not pass constitutional muster. A provision requiring park
owners to cash out their tenants at a price based in part on the
value of the underlying land, does not "substantially advance"the
I City's stated goals of preserving its stock of mobilehome spaces and
ensuring the residents'quiet enjoyment of their homes. To be sure, it
provides a financial boon to the residents who occupy the park which is closing. But it does
I not directly mitigate the detrimental effects of conversion, namely loss of mobilehome park
spaces and displacement of tenants. Indirectly the ordinance may well accomplish the intended
result, since the confiscatory restrictions it places on any conversion of mobilehome parks will
Idoubtless ensure that the parks continue to operate as such throughout the City. But if the City
wishes to acquire land for that purpose, it must use its eminent domain power and compensate
the property owners. (Nollan v. California Coastal Com'n, supra, 107 S.Ct. at p. 3150.)
I
The ordinance is therefore barred by the Fifth Amendment of the United States
I Constitution. It requires the tenants be made whole, based on value of trailers attributable
to being located on the property owner's land,in order for the park owner to use his property
in the future-the proposed ordinance would essentially require the park owner to pay for the
I trailer park twice,since he would therefore be purchasing value which is his. The park owner
cannot be made to pay for the value which is already his. Moreover, the ability of the tenant
to then remove the trailer and sell it again makes clear that the ordinance is irrational and
Ioverbroad to its intended function and to state law restrictions on reasonable relocation costs.
IDolan v. City of Tigard (1994) 114 S.Ct. 2309 is also relevant to these issues, though
not a closure case. There, the City Planning Commission conditioned approval of Dolan's
I application to expand her store and pave her parking lot upon her compliance with
dedication of land for a pedestrian/bicycle pathway intended to relieve traffic congestion in
the City's Central Business District. She appealed the Commission's denial of her request for
Ivariances from these standards to the Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA), alleging that the
land dedication requirements were not related to the proposed development and therefore
constituted an uncompensated taking of her property under the Fifth Amendment. LUBA
Ifound a reasonable relationship between(1)the development and the requirement to dedicate
land for a greenway, since the larger building and paved lot would increase the impervious
I surfaces and thus the runoff into the creek, and (2) alleviating the impact of increased traffic
from the development and facilitating the provision of a pathway as an alternative means of
transportation.
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I0fbh052490 SEAL BEACH TRAILER PARK AGENDA Page 36
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IThe Supreme Court held that the demand on the property owner exceeded any
rational connection (a nexus or "rough proportionality") between the proposed use and the
I demands (exactions) made on the property owner. This case is dispositive of the conversion
ordinance issue. The uncompensated taking occurs in the demand of relocation assistance
which equals the value of the trailer as a possibility decided in the discretion of the tenant.
IThe park owner must pay the cited value or the loan value in order to use his own property.
Any use of the property is held ransom for payment to the tenants. This is the form of
I "extortion" to which the Supreme Court made reference in the Nollan case.2
The Court specifically held that the demand for a bike pathway was unconstitutional
I for several reasons. The city's dedication requirements constitute an uncompensated taking
of property, because under the well-settled doctrine of"unconstitutional conditions," the
government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right in exchange for a
Idiscretionary benefit conferred by the government where the property sought has little or no
relationship to the benefit. In evaluating Dolan's claim, the constitutional test first requires
that it be determined whether an "essential nexus" exists between a legitimate state interest
Iand the permit condition. If one does, then it must be decided whether the degree of the
exactions demanded by the permit conditions bears the required relationship to the projected
Iimpact of the proposed development. 107 S.Ct. at 3147.
The findings upon which the city relied did not show the required nexus between the
1 floodplain easement and Dolan's proposed building.'
I
2 The Dolan Court in referring to Nollan states: "We resolved, however, that the Coastal
Commission's regulatory authority was set completely adrift from its constitutional moorings when
it claimed that a nexus existed between visual access to the ocean and a permit condition requiring
I lateral public access along the Nollan's beachfront lot. Ick., at 837, 107 S.Ct., at 3148. How
enhancing the public's ability to"traverse to and along the shorefront"served the same governmental
purpose of"visual access to the ocean" from the roadway was beyond our ability to countenance.
I The absence of a nexus left the Coastal Commission in the position of simply trying to obtain an
easement through gimmickry,which converted a valid regulation of land use into "an out-and-out
plan of extortion." ad., quoting i.E.D. Associates. Inc. v. Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581, 584, 432
IA.2d 12, 14-15 (1981).
3 "The Community Development Code already required that Dolan leave 150/0 of her property
I as open space, and the undeveloped floodplain would have nearly satisfied that requirement.
However, the city has never said why a public, as opposed to a private, greenway is required in the
interest of flood control. The difference to Dolan is the loss of her ability to exclude others from her
I property, yet the city has not attempted to make any individualized determination to support this
part of its request. The city has also not met its burden of demonstrating that the additional number
of vehicle and bicycle trips generated by Dolan's development reasonably relates to the city's
I requirement for a dedication of the pathway easement. The city must quantify its finding beyond
a conclusory statement that the dedication could offset some of the traffic demand generated by the
development."
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ITc0N CH.001 052499 SEAL BEACH TRAILER PARK AGENDA Page 37
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IThe Court held that the demanded exaction was not related to the intended use of the
property. In our case,there is no use of the future property which would bear any connection
I (nexus)to the displacement of the former tenants. To put the tenants in a better position than
if they voluntarily vacated is to impose a burden which cannot be countenanced under the
Fifth Amendment, because the cost to the park owner results in a windfall to the tenant, and
Iexceeds the cost for relocation of the trailer to another space.' The Court held:
I Without question, had the city simply required petitioner to dedicate a strip of land along
Fanno Creek for public use, rather than conditioning the grant of her permit to redevelop her
property on such a dedication, a taking would have occurred. Nollan, supra, 483 US., at
I 831, 107 S.Ct., at 3145. Such public access would deprive petitioner of the right to exclude
others, "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized
as propery. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 US. 164, 176, 100 S.Ct. 383, 391, 62
I L.Ed.2d 332 (1979)."
In the Rooke case, the Scotts Valley conversion ordinance went beyond the mere
Iregulation of trailer park conversions. By essentially preventing any change of land use
whatsoever, said the Court, ". . .it 'denie[d] an owner economically viable use of his land.'
I (Agins v. Tiburon, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 260.):
Its provisions interfered with each of the threefundamental rights to 'possess, use and dispose"
I of property. (US. v. General Motors Corp., sera, 323 US. at pp. 377-378.)And the
restrictions imposed did not "substantially advance legitimate state interests." (Agins v.
Tiburon, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 262;Nollan v. California Coastal Com'n, ,supra, 107
IS.Ct. 3141.)
In closing, the Rooke Court held that the burden of the conversion could not be placed on
I
the shoulders of the Plaintiffs.
I
The ordinance was intended to benefit a favored class of citizens, namely those persons of low
or moderate income whose principal asset is the mobilehome which is their residence. No one
would dispute that the protection of people whose circumstances make them deserving of
I "unique protection"(Civ. Code 798.55, subd. (a)) is a worthy objective. But that does
not establish that the Rookes and other park owners may be
compelled to absorb the costs of such a 'comprehensive
I
4 The Court stated in this regard: "Under the well-settled doctrine of "unconstitutional
I conditions,"the government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right--here the right
to receive just compensation when property is taken for a public use--in exchange for a discretionary
benefit conferred by the government where the property sought has little or no relationship to the
I benefit. See Perry v. Sindermann,408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972); Pickering
v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist., 391 U.S. 563,568,88 S.Ct. 1731, 1734, 20 L.Ed.2d
811 (1968)."
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1 ARLN I'CO�'.SFALBCH.0111.1152499
SEAL BEACH TRAILER PARK AGENDA Page 38
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' program. '"
' Aspen-Tarpon Springs Limited Partnership
v. George Stuart
No. 92-2814, District Court of Appeal of Florida. First District, Jan. 18, 1994,
The Florida Appellate Court has ruled in Aspen-tarpon Springs Limited Partnership.
etc., et al., Appellants,v. George Stuart. etc., et al., Appellees., No. 92-2814, District Court
of Appeal of Florida, First District, Jan. 18, 1994, that relocation assistance is
unconstitutional.The conversion ordinance also required reimbursement for tenant equity
and value.
I . . .we find that section 723.061(2) constitutes an unconstitutional taking of propero,without
compensation. We agree with the trial court that the statute goes far beyond the legitimate
goal of reasonably accommodating conflicting interests, in elect coercing mobile home park
' owners to surrender indefinitely their rights to possess and occupy their land and to exclude
others. Once the park owners have rented their property to mobile home owners, they are
required by section 723.061(2) to continue doing so unless they buy all the mobile homes or
' pay to have them moved. A statute that requires any form of remuneration
to recover the right to possess and occupy one's own property would
seem to be confiscatory, but the evidence presented to the trial
' court demonstrated that neither the "buy out" option nor the
"relocation" option is even economically feasible. Therefore, as a
' practical matter, the challenged statute authorizes a permanent physical occupation of the park
owner's property and ffectively extinguishes afundamental attribute of ownership, the right
to physically occupy one's land.
' The Court again relied on the failure of the regulation to advance a governmentally
legitimate interest
Unlike section 723.033, the regulatory scheme contained in section 723.061(2) does not
substantially advance a legitimate state interest, but instead singles out mobile home park
' owners to bear an unfair burden, and therefore constitutes an unconstitutional regulatory
taking of their property. &Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 100 S Ct. 2138,
65 L.Ed.2d 106(1980), and cases cited therein.
Guimont v. Clarke
' (1993) 121 Wash.2d 586 [854 P.2d 1]
Cert. Denied, 114 S.Ct. 1216, 127 L.Ed.2d 563 (1994),
'ARGNTcoN.SFALBCH.001.1152499 SEAL BEACH TRAILER PARK AGENDA Page 39
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In Guimont v. Clarke (1993) 121 Wash.2d 586 [854 P.2d 1], cert. denied, 114 S.Ct.
I1216, 127 L.Ed.2d 563 (1994),the same issue was presented. Again,the requirement of value
or equity buy-outs was rejected.
IThe amount of money a park owner must pay under the Act is substantial. In fact, under a
worst case scenario, the size of the park owner's obligation is staggering. If the relocation
assistance fund lacks sufficient resources to pay its share of the burden, the Act leaves park
I owners liable for paying the entire amount of the relocation assistance--up to /17.500 for each
tenant in the park. For example, if a mobile home park has 100 pads, the park owner could
I be responsible for paying/1750,000 solely because the owner wants to exercise his or her right
to close the business. . . . park owners must directly pay relocation assistance even to those
tenants who are notfinancially burdened. . . [1Jhe imposition of costs on closing a business
II cannot be avoided in this manner. We conclude the Act is unduly oppressive and violates
substantive due process.
IIn sum, the park operator has the right to cease doing business to avoid confiscatory
effects of a land use regulation. This right, if interfered with, would constitute a taking. A
I property owner cannot be compelled to stay in business by government imprimatur, not
without payment of just compensation.
IThe park owner clearly has the right to cease doing business.
I
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Inxery rccN.s u scH.a,,.ns24s9 SEAL BEACH TRAILER PARK AGENDA Page 40
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X. NOTIFICATION OF RENT INCREASE
I Pursuant to §2.07 of the Covenant, and without prejudice to all rights and remedies, same
being fully reserved by the park owner,notice is hereby provided of the intent of the park owner
to increase rents in Seal Beach Trailer Park.
This notice is provided sixty(60)days in advance of notification of the tenants in the park
of the rent increase.
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The increase in rents is set forth as follows:
IITotal Allowable rent for 1993 = $33,885.93
Total Allowable rent for 1998 = $44,555.68
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$10,669.75
I1993 1998
I Loan Payment 11,660.48 18,000.00
Ground Rent 3,666.67 3,833.33
Auto 18.83 533.60
I Dues and Subscriptions 0.00 9.58
Insurance 1,209.75 1,188.07
Legal and Accounting 285.25 3,471.43
I Operating Supplies 651.92 651.92
Taxes and Licenses 1,691.42 3,000.00
Repairs and Maintenance 900.42 877.95
I Salaries and Wages 3,757.30 4,029.30
Payroll Taxes 494.73 530.55
1 Telephone(in utilities) 0.00 0.00
IOverhead and Mgmt. 4,606.41 5,036.40
Return on Investment 2,354.00 2,354.00
Utilities 2,478.75 2,626.16
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Total Allowable Rent 33 865. = 36.25%
93 46,142.29
IARENTCON.SEALBCH.OI ARENTCON.SEALBCH.00 0.1152499 SEAL BEACH TRAILER PARK AGENDA Page 41
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ICONCLUSION
This notification provides the City with my views of the issues involving the trailer
park. Before reaching any determination of the manner in which best to address the many
foregoing issues of which I have advised the park owner, Mr. Talley and I have been
Iauthorized to meet to discuss these topics.
It is, accordingly, the desire of the park owner to keep an open and courteous line of
communication with the City.
IThank you for your consideration of the foregoing.
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I1Tc0190I052499 SEAL BEACH TRAILER PARK AGENDA Page 42